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ARTICLE
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS'





E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, JR.
INTRODUCED AND MODERATED BY JOHN Q. BARRETrt
INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States
announced two landmark decisions: Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka1 and its companion case, Boiling v. Sharpe.
2
In Brown, which was a grouping of four separate state cases,
3
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, New York City, and
Elizabeth S. Lenna Fellow, Robert H. Jackson Center, Jamestown, New York
(www.roberthjackson.org). Introduction © 2005 by John Q. Barrett. I am grateful to
the roundtable discussants for their participation, editing and helpful comments; to
Dr. Ophelia DeLaine Gona (daughter of the late Rev. J.A. DeLaine, who commenced
the Briggs v. Elliott litigation attacking school segregation in South Carolina, see
infra note 3) and the Honorable William T. Coleman, Jr. (a former law clerk to
Justice Felix Frankfurter who later worked as a NAACP attorney on the Brown
litigation) for their presence at this roundtable, lectures at companion events,
recollections, and interest; to the Jackson Center and the Supreme Court Historical
Society for cosponsoring the roundtable; and to law students Eleni Zanias, Jennifer
N. Thomas, and Jessica Duffy for their research and transcribing assistance.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
3 The four state cases that were consolidated and decided together in Brown
were Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. [Kansas], No. 1; Briggs et al.
v. Elliott et al. [South Carolina], No. 2; Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince
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and in Bolling, a case originating in the federal government's
District of Columbia, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
its prior precedent 4 and struck down as unconstitutional all state
and federal laws requiring the racially segregated education of
public school students. In the ringing words of Chief Justice Earl
Warren's opinion, the Court concluded
that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that
the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the
actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws .... 5
Last year, fifty years after Brown and Bolling, numerous
events and publications commemorated the golden anniversary of
those landmarks. 6 While many of the perspectives on Brown that
were voiced and written then are celebratory, some are not.7 The
critical perspectives, focusing on all that has not happened since
1954 to achieve true racial equality in the United States, often
target Brown itself for taking its path rather than some
alternative.
In large measure, less-than-celebratory perspectives on
Brown v. Board of Education are focused on the course and
outcome of litigation that did not conclude, but in fact really
Edward County, Virginia, et al., No. 4; and Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al. [Delaware],
No. 10.
4 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Brown and its companion cases involving state laws
were decided under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because that provision applies only to states, Bolling, the companion federal case,
was decided under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling, 347
U.S. at 499-500.6 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-41, 115 Stat. 226 ("To establish a commission for the
purpose of encouraging and providing for the commemoration of the 50th
anniversary of the Supreme Court Decision in Brown v. Board of Education.")(signed Sept. 18, 2001); George W. Bush, President Signs Brown v. Board ofEducation Anniversary Commission: Statement by the President (released Sept. 19,2001), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010919.16.html; GeorgeW. Bush, President Speaks at Brown v. Board of Education National Historic Site(released May 17, 2004), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/
print/20040517-4.html; see also Pub. L. No. 102-525, 106 Stat. 3438 ("To provide for
the establishment of the Brown v. Board of Education National Historic Site in the
State of Kansas and for other purposes.") (1992).
7 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004).
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began, on May 17, 1954. The Brown and Bolling decisions
identified a new constitutional requirement-the Constitution
prohibits racially segregated education-but they did not decree
a remedy for the segregated school systems that then existed.
Instead, the Supreme Court ordered, in Brown itself, that the
school segregation cases be put back on its docket for further
argument and requested further briefing regarding the kind of
decree the Court should issue.
8
One year later, after additional briefing by parties and amici,
lengthy oral arguments, and extensive work and judicial
deliberations within the privacy of the Supreme Court, the
Justices decreed on Tuesday, May 31, 1955, again unanimously,
that the Court was remanding the cases to the trial courts that
had heard them originally for those courts to fashion local
desegregation decrees. 9 This decision has come to be known as
Brown II. It is best remembered, and often attacked, for a four-
word phrase that perhaps invited, and thus encouraged,
governmental delay in desegregating schools and racist
resistance to that process. In Brown II, we recall, the Supreme
Court ordered the lower courts, on remand, to go about ending
segregated school systems "with all deliberate speed."'10
On May 18, 2005, just two weeks before the 50th
anniversary of the Brown II decision, the Robert H. Jackson
Center in Jamestown, New York, 1 and the Supreme Court
Historical Society assembled for a group discussion four
attorneys who had been Supreme Court law clerks during that
momentous Term of the Court. These men, Gordon B. Davidson,
Daniel J. Meador, Earl E. Pollock, and E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.,
had been, fifty and more years earlier, involved to varying
degrees in the Supreme Court's work, and privy to various
Justices' thoughts, as first Brown I and then Brown H were being
decided. After leaving their Supreme Court clerkships in the
summer of 1955, these men built distinguished careers in
different cities and generally did not see each other or keep in
8 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96 & n.13.
9 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955) ("Brown IF).
10 Id. at 301.
11 The Robert H. Jackson Center is dedicated to the life, work, words, and legacy
of Justice Jackson (1892-1954). See www.roberthjackson.org. He was one of the nine
Justices serving on the Supreme Court as it considered and decided Brown and
Bolling during the Court's October Terms 1952 and 1953. Jackson died on October 9,
1954, prior to the Brown II oral arguments.
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touch. Although they were interviewed individually over the
years about Brown, these former law clerks had not, until this
discussion, gathered as a group to share, compare, and assemble
their recollections of Brown, and especially Brown II. The result,
on May 18th of this year and now in this publication,12 is a
detailed discussion that describes from the inside what the
Supreme Court decided and how the Justices got there in Brown
II, the culmination of the Brown v. Board of Education
landmark.
This Jackson Center/Supreme Court Historical Society
roundtable discussion among Brown II law clerks is the second
half of a pair of proceedings. In 2004, the Jackson Center hosted
a similar discussion among four attorneys who had worked as
law clerks to Justices during the Supreme Court's October Term
1953 and thus were involved, again in varying degrees, in the
process that culminated in Brown L 13 Two participants in that
12 The participants in the May 18, 2005, discussion lightly edited their
remarks for this publication.
13 See John David Fassett, Earl E. Pollock, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. & Frank
E.A. Sander, Supreme Court Law Clerks' Recollections of Brown v. Board of
Education, 78 St. John's L. Rev. 515 (2004) (introduced and moderated by John Q.
Barrett).
Former Supreme Court law clerks who worked for justices during the Terms of
various segregation cases have published these additional recollections of clerkship
experiences: Daniel J. Meador, Justice Black and His Law Clerks, 15 ALA. L. REV. 57(1962-63) [hereinafter Meador, Justice Black and His Law Clerks]; Daniel J.Meador, Mr. Justice Black: A Tribute, 57 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1971); Interview by
Mortimer Schwartz with William W. Oliver, former law clerk to Chief JusticeWarren (May 17, 1972), WORKING IN THE SUPREME COURT. COMMENTS ON COURT,
BROWN DECISION, WARREN AND OTHER JUSTICES, in EARL WARREN: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIP (Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University ofCalifornia/Berkeley) (law clerk to Chief Justice Vinson, O.T. 1952, and then to ChiefJustice Warren, O.T. 1953); Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role.:
Distinctions, Roots, and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817, 822 (1979) [hereinafter
Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role] (law clerk to Chief Justice Warren,O.T. 1954) (discussing Brown I); Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan-A Comment on Fried and Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67, 68 (1991)[hereinafter Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan] (identifying a Harlan
contribution to the Court's Brown II opinion); JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE:
THE LIFE OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY 555-80 (1994) [hereinafter JOHN D.FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE] (law clerk to Justice Reed, O.T. 1953); JACK FASSETT,
THE SHAPING YEARS: A MEMOIR OF MY YOUTH AND EDUCATION 133-46 (2000);
www.law.yale.edu/outside/ html/Alumni-affairs/alumniwkend av03.htm (video of an
October 31, 2003, panel discussion, Yale Law School Alumni Supreme Court ClerksDuring the Brown Era, featuring Charles A. Reich (law clerk to Justice Black, O.T.1953), Frederick M. Rowe (law clerk to Justice Clark, O.T. 1952), William D. Rogers(law clerk to Justice Reed, O.T. 1952), Ernest Rubenstein (law clerk to Justice Clark,
[Vol. 79:823
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discussion, Earl Pollock and Barrett Prettyman, also participated
in the discussion presented here because, during 1954-55, the
Term of Brown II, each was in his second year as a Supreme
Court law clerk.
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
To orient the reader to the relevant events and to preview
particular topics that are addressed in the roundtable discussion
that follows, this introduction now offers a general chronology of
the path of Brown v. Board of Education in the Supreme Court
during the years 1952-1955.14
The school segregation cases first came to the Supreme
Court in the October Term 1952. The Court, then led by Chief
Justice Fred M. Vinson, heard oral arguments in the cases over
three days that December. When the Justices met subsequently
in conference, although no definitive vote was taken, it was
apparent that the Court was divided. The Justices ultimately
decided not to decide the cases in that Term. Instead, on June 8,
1953, the Court ordered the parties to file additional briefs
addressing specific questions-including, with significance to the
Court's ultimate decision two years later in Brown II, two
detailed, compound questions about remedies that the Court
might order in the event it declared school segregation
unconstitutional-and it set the cases for reargument the
following fall.15
On September 8, 1953, the trajectory of the school
segregation cases changed dramatically when Chief Justice
Vinson, a Kentucky native who seemed to be committed to
reaffirming the constitutionality of racial segregation, suddenly
died. At that time, the next Supreme Court Term was imminent,
O.T. 1953), Raymond S. Troubh (law clerk to Justice Burton, O.T. 1953), and James
R. Wimmer (law clerk to Justice Minton, O.T. 1953)); Charles A. Reich, Deciding the
Fate of Brown, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 137 (2004); and John D. Fassett, A Plea for the
Demise of a Stubborn Myth, in BLACK, WHITE, AND BROWN: THE LANDMARK SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASE IN RETROSPECT 117, 117-49 (Clare Cushman & Melvin I.
Urofsky eds., 2004).
14 For much more detailed information on the history of the Brown cases in
their localities of origin, as developing litigations and in the Supreme Court, see
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (rev. & expanded ed.
2004), and Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in
the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979).
15 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (per curiam).
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so President Eisenhower, who had been in office for less than ten
months, acted quickly to fill the vacant Chief Justiceship. The
president announced on Wednesday, September 30, that he was
making a recess appointment of the Governor of California, Earl
Warren, to serve as Chief Justice. Warren thus was serving in
that judicial office only five days later when the Court began its
new Term. Under his leadership, and benefiting from his
personal warmth and political skills, the Court quickly developed
new spirit and cohesion. It also, at Chief Justice Warren's
explicit instruction, began to treat the school segregation cases as
strictly confidential matters that were to be discussed only
among and by the Justices themselves.
On December 7, 8, and 9, 1953, the Supreme Court heard
reargument in the five cases. Beginning later that week and
continuing over the next months, the Justices regularly discussed
the cases in their private conference, on paper, and in small
conversations among themselves,16 but they took no votes to
decide them. As Chief Justice Warren recalled Brown in his
memoirs, the Justices,
conscious of its gravity and far-reaching effects, decided not to
put the case to a vote until we had thoroughly explored the
implications of any decision. As a result, we discussed all sides
dispassionately week after week, testing arguments of counsel,
suggesting various approaches, and at times acting as "devil's
advocates" in certain phases of the case .... 17
On January 11, 1954, President Eisenhower formally
nominated Chief Justice Warren for appointment to the office
that he already held as a recess appointee, and on March 1 the
16 See, e.g., F.F. [Justice Frankfurter] memorandum, "Dear Brethren," Jan. 15,
1954, at 1 (circulating "considerations [that] have arisen in me in regard to the
fashioning of a decree ... with the thought that sometimes one's thinking, whether
good or bad, may stimulate good thoughts in others"), in Earl Warren Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress ("EW LOC") Box 571. Frankfurter's five
pages of thoughts about possible judicial decrees that would implement a Court
decision against school segregation recognized the limits of judicial power and, for
the first time in this context, invoked the now-famous phrase "all deliberate speed":
Not even a court can in a day change a deplorable situation into the ideal.
It does its duty if it gets effectively under way the righting of a wrong.
When the wrong is a deeply rooted state policy the court does its duty if it
decrees measures that reverse the direction of the unconstitutional policy
so as to uproot it "with all deliberate speed." Virginia v. West Virginia, 222
U.S. 17, 20 [(1911)].
Id. at 2.
17 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 2 (1977).
[Vol. 79:823
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Senate unanimously confirmed this nomination. Only then did
the Justices, in conference, actually, formally decide that they
would strike down school segregation.' 8  Warren, who was
strongly of that view and had solid support from a majority of his
colleagues, assigned the opinion-writing responsibilities to
himself. He drafted short opinions in Brown and Bolling and
then, through in-person discussions with colleagues, assembled a
unanimous Court to hold school segregation unconstitutional.
On May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Warren announced the Court's 9-
0 decisions declaring state and federal school segregation laws
and systems to be unconstitutional.
The May 1954 decisions were not, of course, completed
adjudications. At the same time that the Court decreed school
segregation to be unconstitutional, it also deferred ordering any
remedial action. Instead, the Court again restored the cases to
its docket for the coming Term and asked the parties to file new
briefs addressing the question of remedy. The Court specifically
asked the parties to address whether its holding that school
segregation was unconstitutional required a decree "that Negro
children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice,"
or whether the Court could use its equitable powers to permit
gradual adjustment from segregated to desegregated school
systems. 19  As to the latter issue of the Court potentially
exercising equitable powers to bring segregation to an end
gradually, the Court also asked the parties to brief:
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these
cases;
18 In his memoirs, Chief Justice Warren wrote that the Court's actual vote in
conference to hold school segregation unconstitutional occurred in February
1954. See id. at 2, 285. No contemporaneous record has been found that corroborates
this recollection, however, and it seems unlikely that the Chief Justice would have
called for this vote before he had been confirmed by the Senate, or that the
conference vote could have occurred during the second, third, or fourth weeks of
February 1954, when the Court was in recess and not all Justices were present in
Washington, D.C. Cf. Letter from Bill [Justice Douglas] to Harold [Justice Burton],
Feb. 22, 1954, at 1-2 ("I meant to talk with you before I left Wash DC to see if you
would have a chance to talk with Earl [Chief Justice Warren] + urge expedition of
the big cases. Now that he will be quickly confirmed, we can proceed with some
dispatch I hope[.]") (writing from Tucson, AZ), in Harold H. Burton Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress ("HHB LOC") Box 314. Thus a March 1954
conference vote, on some date following both Chief Justice Warren's March 1, 1954,
confirmation by the Senate and the Court's March 8 return from its 30-day recess,
seems a better estimate.
19 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 & n.13 (1954).
20051
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear
evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for
such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance
with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so
what general directions should the decrees of this Court
include and what procedures should the courts of first
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more
detailed decrees? 20
The Court also invited the Attorney General of the United States
to participate in the further briefing and argument, and it invited
the attorneys general in all states with segregated schools to
appear as amici curiae if they made such requests by September
15 and filed briefs by October 1, 1954.21 Three weeks later, on
Monday, June 7, 1954, the Court announced its final opinions of
the Term and began its summer recess.
During the ensuing summer of 1954, as the litigants and
amici curiae analyzed the Brown decision and began to draft the
briefs that they would file in the fall, the Supreme Court Justices
and their law clerks also continued to work on the segregation
cases. Chief Justice Warren continued to lead the Court's
collective work. In discussions with Justice Stanley Reed, for
example, Warren learned that Reed had amassed a large amount
of information on segregation-related topics. 22 It included a
collection of state statutes prohibiting segregation, a compilation
of all Court cases decided in the previous decade that involved
denial of due process claims, a comparison of white and Negro
crime rates in cities that had legal segregation and others that
did not, research concerning the NAACP and whether it had a
charter that adopted ending segregation as an objective, and
research that indicated the attitudes of other countries, the
Catholic Church, and the armed forces towards segregation. 23
Warren later borrowed these materials from Reed's law clerk and
met with him several times for informal discussions, including
about race relations. 24 Perhaps stimulated by Justice Reed's
20 Id.
21 Id. at 495-96.
22 See JACK FASSETT, supra note 13, at 145.
23 See JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 565-67.
24 See JACK FASSETT, supra note 13, at 146; see also Memo to Justice Reed re
Integration Materials, n.d. (departing law clerk Fassett's report to Justice Reed,
[Vol. 79:823
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research, Chief Justice Warren asked Justice Harold Burton (and
presumably other Justices as well) to think about research that
could be done, resulting in some kind of report, within the Court
that summer. Burton, in response, wrote Warren a
memorandum outlining fact issues that could be researched and
addressed in a report, including the current status of school
desegregation, procedures being employed to move from school
segregation to desegregation, and programs that had been
authorized to promote future school integration. 25 Justice Felix
Frankfurter, writing from summer lodging in Charlemont,
Massachusetts, to Warren back at the Court, suggested that it
look to the experiences in northern, western, and middle western
States to shed light on anticipated problems with
desegregation. 26
Chief Justice Warren continued to canvas his colleagues and,
in the end, he confirmed that five others-Justices Reed, Burton,
Frankfurter, Jackson, and Tom Clark-each would direct a law
clerk to work with other designated clerks on a collective
segregation research project. Thus, before Warren left
Washington after July 4th for his own vacation in California, he
dictated a memorandum assigning his soon-to-arrive new law
clerk Gerald Gunther to coordinate this task.27 Gunther and five
other clerks organized themselves, performed the research, and
drafted reports on their work and findings. 28 They ultimately
written in approximately mid-July 1954, on Fassett's book loans to Chief Justice
Warren and conversations with him about appropriate decrees in the school
segregation cases), reprinted in JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note
13, at 630-31.
25 See Memorandum [from Justice Burton] to Chief Justice [Warren],
"Suggestions as to Report on Integration of Races in Public Schools," June 24, 1954,
in EW LOC Box 574.
26 See Letter from F.F. [Justice Frankfurter] to Hon. Earl Warren, July 5, 1954,
in EW LOC Box 574.
27 Cover note from [Chief Justice Warren's secretary] M.K. McHugh to Mr.
Gunther, July 7, 1954 ("Before leaving for the West Coast, the Chief Justice dictated
the attached memorandum which he asked me to give to you when you reported to
work."), in EW LOC Box 574; see [Chief Justice Warren's] Memorandum to Mr.
Gunther, July 6, 1954, in EW LOC Box 574. Gunther's first day of work in Chief
Justice Warren's chambers was Monday, July 19, 1954. See typed note on Gerald
Gunther letter to Mrs. McHugh, June 22, 1954, in EW LOC Box 396.
28 The law clerks who participated in this work were Gerald Gunther (who was
one of Chief Justice Warren's two new clerks, joining returning chief clerk Earl
Pollock, during O.T. 1954), Gordon Davidson (one of Justice Reed's two new clerks),
Richard E. Sherwood (one of Justice Frankfurter's two new clerks), Barrett
Prettyman (Justice Jackson's returning and sole law clerk), John Kaplan (one of
2005]
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produced a unified text, had it set in type by the Court's print
shop and on November 17, 1954, circulated from the Chief
Justice's chambers an unsigned, eighty-one-page "Segregation
Research Report" to the Justices.29 The Report considers five
broad topics: it surveys the "normal" practices of school
administrators, focusing particularly on the methods by which
they determine which students attend which schools; it
summarizes, state-by-state, Southern reactions to Brown I; it
summarizes experiences in various jurisdictions, particularly
border states, that tried to implement desegregation plans in the
years before Brown I; it describes the plans to abolish public
schools that were proposed in some states following Brown I and
analogous experiences in some Northern areas; and it discusses
the limited experience of courts in the supervision of
governmental districting processes that are historically
"gerrymandered." Separately, the clerks assembled and
circulated to the Justices a collection of regional, state, and
metropolitan maps. These maps, along with an accompanying
final section of the clerks' Report, show racially concentrated and
separated housing patterns and the varying boundaries of
particular school attendance district systems.30
Justice Clark's two new law clerks), and William B. Matteson (one of Justice
Burton's two new clerks). See Outline-Segregation Research Project, n.d., in The
Papers of E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Mss 86-5, Special Collections, University of
Virginia Law Library ("EBP UVa"), Box 2.
29 The law clerks' "Segregation Research Report" is preserved in a number of
the Justices' archived papers. See, e.g., Segregation Research Report, n.d., in EW
LOC Box 574; id., in William 0. Douglas Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress ("WOD LOC") Box 1151 (stamped to indicate that it was circulated by
Chief Justice Warren on November 17, 1954). Justice Clark's archived copy of this
Report also is available online. See utopia.utexas.edu/explore/clark/
view doc.php?id=a27-04-14.
30 The clerks apparently had only one set of maps, so they provided a single
"Maps" report, prepared by Jackson law clerk Barrett Prettyman, to the Justices
collectively. It contains four pages of text, a large map showing the locations of black
and white households in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and eleven other maps
showing segregated school locations and/or school district boundaries in Pensacola,
Florida; Madison County, Florida; Escambia County, Florida; Buffalo, New York;
West Roxbury, Massachusetts; Shorewood, Wisconsin; Washington, D.C.; Whittier,
California; and West Hartford, Connecticut. On November 17, 1954, Chief Justice
Warren's chambers circulated this report to the associate justices in order of
seniority (i.e., starting with Justice Black). Each justice ultimately received the
report in turn and, after initialing its covering circulation slip, passed the report
along to his next-senior colleague. Justice Harlan, appointed to the Court in March
1955, was the last justice to receive the Maps report, which is preserved today in
Prettyman's archived papers. See Discussion of Maps, n.d., in EBP UVa, Box 2,
[Vol. 79:823
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As the summer ended and the new Supreme Court Term
approached, state attorneys general notified the Court of their
intentions to submit briefs and, in some instances, also to
participate in the oral arguments concerning how to put Brown
into effect.31 The states seeking oral argument also requested
extensions of time in which to file their briefs. On September 21,
1954, the Court announced that November 15 would be the
deadline for filing briefs, and that the Court would devote the full
week of December 6, 1954-more than a month after the nation's
midterm elections-to hearing oral arguments. In the end, the
parties to the five cases, the United States, the American
Veterans Committee Inc., and the attorneys general of the states
of Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Texas all filed new briefs in the cases.
32
On Saturday, October 9, 1954, just five days after the start of
the Court's new Term, Justice Jackson died suddenly of a heart
attack. On November 8, President Eisenhower nominated Judge
John M. Harlan of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit to succeed Jackson on the Supreme Court.
Although it was initially expected that Harlan would be
confirmed before Thanksgiving, the chairman of the Senate
subcommittee to which Harlan's nomination had been referred
announced on Friday, November 19, that the subcommittee
would not consider the nomination until the new Congress was
seated in January 1955. 33 On the following Monday morning, the
Folder 2. In addition to the one circulating Maps report, each Justice apparently
received in this time period, from someone, to keep, a 1950 census map showing in
five brown-to-orange-to-yellow color shades the concentration of the "Nonwhite"
population in each county in the thirteen Southern states. See, e.g., EW LOC Box
574 (containing Chief Justice Warren's copy of this map); WOD LOC Box 1151
(containing Justice Douglas's copy of the same); HHB LOC Box 257 (containing
Justice Burton's copy of the same).
31 See Int'l News Serv., 6 States in Hearing Role, WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD,
Sept. 17, 1954, at 11. Arkansas, Maryland, and Tennessee notified the Court that
they would submit amicus briefs. Florida, North Carolina, and Oklahoma notified
the Court that they would also participate, along with the four states that were
parties and the District of Columbia, in oral argument. See id.
32 See 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 631-1070 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter Kurland & Casper] (reproducing these briefs).
33 See Thomas Winship, Nomination of Harlan to Court Is Delayed, WASH. POST
& TIMES HERALD, Nov. 20, 1954, at 1. Sen. William Langer (R.-ND), chairman of the
Senate Judiciary subcommittee, granted this delay at the request of Sen. James 0.
Eastland (D.-MS), an ardent segregationist. This postponement of Judge Harlan's
hearing until January 1955 had the effect of precluding him, a northerner, from
20051
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Supreme Court responded to this prolonging of its short-handed
status by issuing a new order in Brown II: "In view of the
absence of a full Court," it announced, the school segregation
cases "scheduled for argument December 6th, are continued."34
Justice Harlan's appointment, which members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee ultimately delayed for months, finally was
confirmed by the Senate on March 16, 1955. Shortly thereafter,
the Court announced that it would devote the full week of April
11 to hearing oral arguments in Brown II.
On Sunday, April 10, 1955, the day before the oral
arguments commenced, the Justices received an additional,
detailed document from the six law clerks who previously had
submitted the "Segregation Research Report" on November 17,
1954. This document, captioned the "Law Clerks'
Recommendations for Segregation Decree," advocates that the
Court remand the cases to the lower courts and issue a simple
decree, giving guidance for lower courts to follow on remand, and
issue an opinion including other specified content.35 The clerks
also reported, however, that they were not unanimous on most of
these points. The document includes, for example, one unnamed
clerk's argument, in disagreement with the view shared by the
other five, against the Court giving lower courts any guidance
beyond the terms of a simple remedial decree.
The Brown II oral arguments, running across four days,
filled over thirteen hours. On Monday, April 11, the Court heard
oral arguments on behalf of the parties to the five cases. On
Tuesday, the Court continued to hear from these advocates,
including NAACP counsel Thurgood Marshall representing the
plaintiffs. On Wednesday, the Court heard oral arguments from
attorneys representing amici states North Carolina, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Maryland, and Texas, and from the Solicitor General
of the United States. On Thursday, the Court's argument week
concluded with rebuttal argument by Marshall. 36
Near the end of this oral argument week, someone-likely
Justice Frankfurter-gave Chief Justice Warren a draft decree to
joining the Supreme Court in time to hear the then-scheduled December 1954 oral
arguments in the school segregation cases. See id. at 6.
34 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 348 U.S. 886 (1954) (per curiam).
35 See Law Clerks' Recommendation for Segregation Decree, in EW LOC Box
574; id., in WOD LOC Box 1151. This nine-page document is unsigned and undated.
36 See Kurland & Casper, supra note 32, at 1071-1289 (reproducing transcripts
of these oral arguments).
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consider. It provided that the five cases would be remanded to
their respective lower courts for them to enter appropriate
decrees to carry out the Supreme Court's mandate in light of
Brown I and Bolling. The proposed decree also addressed, in
language that was to become famous, the speed with which those
courts should act: "Decrees in conformity with this decree, on the
basis of detailed findings, shall be issued by the appropriate
lower courts with all deliberate speed, after due hearing on the
relevant issues."3
7
On Saturday, April 16, 1955, the Justices met in conference
to discuss and decide the remedy cases. They agreed on the
objective of deciding the cases unanimously, gave no serious
consideration to ordering immediate school desegregation, and
generally ranged widely in their discussion of whether and how
to issue any remedial decree. 38 Chief Justice Warren again
assigned himself, as he had in Brown I, responsibility for
drafting the Court's opinion. He had begun, even before the
Justices' conference and vote, to outline in longhand a tentative
draft opinion.39 In the second half of May, Warren revised this
initial draft and wrote new passages to augment it.
40 His law
clerks assembled the Chief Justice's draft pieces to create a
37 Decree #2, Apr. 14, 1955, at 1-2, in EW LOC Box 574. Although this
document has no identified author, circumstances suggest strongly that it came from
Justice Frankfurter. First, this draft contains some of the distinctive ideas 
and
phrases, including "all deliberate speed," that he had been thinking, writing, and
circulating to his colleagues as they considered the school segregation cases. See
supra note 16; see also infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of
the phrase "all deliberate speed"). Second, the "April 14, 1955," date on the top right-
hand corner of the first page of "Decree #2" is written in Frankfurter's distinctive
hand. Third, the "Decree #2" name and its content suggest that it followed on
another Frankfurter memorandum, this one dated and initialed in typeface, in
which he described to Warren on that very day the alternatives of a "bare bones"
decree versus one in which the Supreme Court articulated some standards for lower
courts to follow on remand. See F.F. [Justice Frankfurter], Memorandum on the
Segregation Decree, Apr. 14, 1955, in EW LOC Box 574.
38 See generally THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE
PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 662-69 (Del
Dickson ed., 2001); Hutchinson, supra note 14, at 54-57.
39 See Chief Justice Warren's notes, "Tentative," at 1-5, in EW LOC Box 574.
On Thursday, April 21, 1955, five days after the Justices' conference discussion of
Brown II, Chief Justice Warren had his handwritten draft opinion typed, and 
he
then continued to edit the document. See "4/21/55" typescript at 1-4, in EW LOC Box
574.
40 See "5/18/55" typescript pages, with handwritten edits by Chief Justice
Warren, in EW LOC Box 574; "C.J. Draft-5/23/55," in EW LOC Box 574; "Law clerks'
composite #1 Draft," May 24, 1955, in EW LOC Box 574.
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composite draft opinion, which Warren then circulated to anddiscussed with his colleagues. Although some Justices suggested
language to the Chief Justice--Justice Harlan, for instance,
persuaded Warren to add to the opinion the strong statement
that "it should go without saying that the vitality of these
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them"41-the Court continued to be
unanimous as the opinion took final form.
Justice Frankfurter provided the last, and historically the
most significant, editorial change to Chief Justice Warren's
proposed Brown II opinion. Frankfurter had been urging Warren
since early 1954, months before Brown I was decided, to state
explicitly that governments would be permitted to dismantle
their unconstitutionally segregated school systems "with alldeliberate speed."42 On May 24, 1955, Frankfurter wrote toWarren that he was joining his Brown II draft, and to repeat, for
at least the third time, his request for an opinion that contained
that four-word phrase:
I have only one further and minor remark to make. I still think
that "with all deliberate speed", Virginia v. West Virginia 222U.S. 17, 22, is preferable to "at the earliest practicable date" (p.4). The reference to Virginia v. West Virginia is, from my point
of view, all to the good. That, too, involved constitutional
rights-the right of a State to have this Court enforce its just
claims against another State. And if the Virginia litigation may
suggest that it takes time to get enforcement, that is a good
intimation.43
When they discussed this suggestion in person, Frankfurter
found that Warren seemed amenable. 44 On May 27, Frankfurter
wrote once more to the Chief Justice to close the deal:
I still strongly believe that "with all deliberate speed" conveys
more effectively the process of time for the effectuation of ourdecision. And the reference to Virginia v. West Virginia, I deemdesirable in that it is the nearest experience this Court has hadin trying to get obedience from a state for a decision highly
41 Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); see Gunther, Another View of Justice
Harlan, supra note 13, at 68.
42 See supra notes 16, 37.
43 F.F. [Justice Frankfurter] to The Chief Justice [Warren], May 24, 1955, in
EW LOC Box 574.
44 See F.F. [Justice Frankfurter] to The Chief Justice [Warren], May 27, 1955, in
EW LOC Box 574.
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unpalatable to it. I think it is highly desirable to educate public
opinion-the parties themselves and the general public-to an
understanding that we are at the beginning of a process of
enforcement and not concluding it. In short, I think it is far
better to habituate the public's mind to the realization of this,
as both the phrase "with all deliberate speed" and the citation of
Virginia v. West Virginia, are calculated to do.
45
On Tuesday, May 31, 1955, Chief Justice Warren announced
the Supreme Court's unanimous Brown II decision. It declared
that the school segregation cases would be remanded to the
district courts from which they had arisen, and that those courts
should use their equitable powers to fashion practical, flexible
remedial decrees. 46 The Supreme Court also directed these lower
courts to require each defendant to "make a prompt and
reasonable start toward full compliance" with Brown I and
Bolling.47 But the Supreme Court also authorized lower courts to
make findings thereafter, as they retained jurisdiction in these
cases, that any defendant had established a need for additional
time as it pursued "good faith compliance at the earlier
practicable date" with the Supreme Court's school desegregation
decree, and thus to grant such an extension.
48 Finally, as to the
parties to the five cases, the Supreme Court directed the lower
courts "[t]o take such proceedings and enter such orders and
decrees consistent with this [Brown II] opinion as are necessary
and proper to admit [these parties] to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed . . .49
BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND ON THE PARTICIPANTS
Gordon B. Davidson, a graduate of Centre College, the
University of Louisville School of Law and Yale Law School,
is Of Counsel to Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP in Louisville.
He served as a law clerk to Justice Stanley Reed during the
Supreme Court's October Term 1954.
Daniel J. Meador, a graduate of Auburn University, the
University of Alabama School of Law and Harvard Law
45 Id.
46 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299-300.
47 Id. at 300.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 301.
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School, is James Monroe Professor of Law Emeritus at the
University of Virginia School of Law. He served as a law
clerk to Justice Hugo L. Black during the Supreme Court's
October Term 1954.
Earl E. Pollock, a graduate of the University of Minnesota
and the Northwestern University School of Law, retired in1992 from his partnership in the Chicago law firm of
Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal. He became a law clerk toChief Justice Fred M. Vinson in summer 1953 and, following
Vinson's death that September, a law clerk to Chief Justice
Earl Warren for the Supreme Court's October Terms 1953
and 1954.
E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., a graduate of Yale University
and the University of Virginia School of Law, is Of Counsel
to Hogan & Hartson in Washington, D.C. He served as
Justice Robert H. Jackson's only law clerk during the
Supreme Court's October Terms 1953 and 1954 and, after
Jackson's death in October 1954, clerked for Justices Felix
Frankfurter and John M. Harlan, successively, during the
remainder of the 1954 Term.
THE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
Moderator: Good morning. My name is John Barrett. I am a
Professor of Law at St. John's University in New
York City and the Elizabeth S. Lenna Fellow at the
Robert H. Jackson Center in Jamestown, New
York.
We are here this morning to discuss the
final, and perhaps the most important, part of theBrown v. Board of Education decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States. The Court's
May 1954 decision declared the unconstitutionality
of public school segregation, but it did not decree
what legal remedy the prevailing parties were
entitled to receive. On this question of "remedy,"
the Court in 1954 merely announced that it would
hear additional argument on that issue during the
next Court Term. The Court invited additional
briefing, not only from the parties to the five cases
LAW CLERKS RECALL BROWN II
known as Brown, but also from all interested
states that would be affected by and work to
implement the new regime that the Court had just
announced. Thus culminated the next twelve-
month period that we know now, fifty years later,
as the year of Brown v. Board of Education II.
We are very privileged to have with us four
distinguished attorneys who were present on the
inside of the Supreme Court process for that year
of deciding Brown II. I would like to turn to each
of you and get a bit of personal flavor on who your
boss was and how it came to be that you were a
Supreme Court law clerk. I'll turn to you first,
Earl Pollock. Fred Vinson will be a background
figure, but you might tell us a bit about him and
then of course tell us about your coming to be the
clerk of Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Pollock: I came to the Court in June of 1953 to work as a
law clerk to Chief Justice Vinson. Unfortunately,
that proved to be of short duration because in
September of 1953, in fact the same weekend that
my wife and I had just driven him home to his
apartment in the Wardman Park Hotel, he died.
For approximately three weeks or so we were on
tenterhooks waiting to find out whether I was
going to start my practice much sooner than I had
expected because I might not be reappointed. But
then Earl Warren was appointed to succeed
Vinson, and he asked me and the other two Vinson
clerks to continue as his clerks.
Vinson was of course a radically different
type of person than Earl Warren. Both Vinson and
Warren were politicians in every sense of the word,
but Warren was much more of a, shall we say,
public personality, enormously popular in
California. So far as I know, he's the only
Californian who ever was nominated by both the
Democratic and Republican parties for the position
of Governor. He had a very commanding presence.
He seemed to be instantly liked by almost everyone
whom he came in contact with, whether it be other





or chauffeurs or whatever. He had very much of a
common touch and it was a great experience
working for him. I was pleased that he asked me
to continue for a second year as his law clerk,
whereupon I then achieved the most distinguished
title that I have ever had in my entire life: I was
Chief Law Clerk to the Chief Justice of the United
States. Everything since then has been downhill(chuckles).
Barrett Prettyman, you'll have to do this three
times, but for now just double duty: Can you
introduce us a bit to Robert Jackson, and also to
Felix Frankfurter? And tell us about the process
by which you became a law clerk?
Robert Jackson was an absolutely wonderful
person to work for and particularly to be his only
clerk because I didn't have to deal with another
clerk doing part of my work. It was a busy time. Ihad to write cert. memos in all the cases we got
that Term. He asked me to stay the second Term
and we were beginning that when he very suddenly
passed away. In an unpublished Brown opinion
which he assumed he would be filing, a concurring
opinion, while Vinson was still alive, he referred to
the decree a couple of times and primarily seemed
to think that it would be Congress's task to deal
with the school situation now that the Court had
ruled. He didn't go into any great detail about
that.
Justice Frankfurter was in my office a lot
while Jackson was alive. He proselytized me under
the mistaken assumption that I would have some
say in getting Jackson to do one thing or another.
But he, in any event, as soon as Harlan was
appointed, got ahold of Harlan and suggested that
he come to the Court with somebody who was
already there. And he was the one who talked him
into hiring me virtually sight unseen.
Harlan immediately became interested in
the decree problem and asked me to write a memo
to him, which I did. It was exactly fifty pages long,
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Moderator:
Davidson:
summarizing each of the cases, the positions that
the parties were taking on all pending questions,
everything from should there be a master
appointed to run the cases, what rules should the
local school boards have, should there be
immediate compliance, etc., and he asked me not
only to summarize the briefs, but to state my own
views about the decree, which I did.
So then he finally came down before he was
actually a member of the Court and we met, we
talked. What a wonderful person he was too. A
lawyer's lawyer, a judge's judge, he was very bright
and serious, not in the sense of having no sense of
humor, but very serious about his work.
Gordon, let me turn to you. Stanley Reed was a
long-time veteran of the Court by the time you
arrived. Give us a sense of him.
Well, of course he was from Kentucky but
interestingly he was brought to Washington in
1929 by Herbert Hoover. Reed, of course, was an
avid Democrat, but he was brought there because
of his expertise in the farm area. He was a
practicing lawyer in Maysville, Kentucky, and he
knew the tobacco business and the farm business
very well. Hoover brought him up as counsel to the
Federal Farm Board where he served for a number
of years and after that Hoover appointed him to
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which
had just been formed to take care of the banks and
the difficulty they were having during the
Depression. And so he was in that capacity as
general counsel when Roosevelt was elected.
Reed always said that a principal reason
that he got to be a Supreme Court Justice was
because when he went to a meeting at the White
House with Roosevelt for the first time, a man met
him at the door and said, "Stanley you don't
remember me? I was in prep school with you."
Stanley said, "Oh, really, that's great," and he went
back to meet with the President. He said he was
sure that for the next four years that fellow,
20051
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Marvin McIntyre, the President's White House
secretary, always reminded Roosevelt of his old
prep school friend. So Reed always felt that he had
a leg up because of his friend at the White House.
Reed became Roosevelt's Solicitor General.
Actually, he earned his spurs, I suppose, by the
famous Gold Clause Cases, which he argued and
won earlier.[50] As Solicitor General he argued
most of the early New Deal cases on behalf of the
Roosevelt Administration. In 1938, he was
appointed by Roosevelt to the Supreme Court and
served for nineteen years thereafter. He obviously
was very interested and very involved in both
Brown I and Brown II and I guess we'll get to that
a little later.
Moderator: Dan Meador, let me turn to you. Justice Black was
also from the South. He was from the Deep
South-Alabama, as you are. Introduce us a bit to
your Justice, Hugo L. Black.
Meador: Justice Black had been elected to the United States
Senate in 1926 from Alabama. So I grew up
knowing who he was and hearing a lot about him,
and actually I aspired to become his law clerk evenlong before I went to law school, because two men
older than I from my hometown had been his law
clerks. So I knew of the position of law clerk, and I
decided that that would be a pretty interesting
thing to do. So that had been in my mind all the
50 The Gold Clause Cases were argued before the Supreme Court on January 8,
9, 10, and 11, 1935. Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, who opened and closed
the government's oral argument in the cases, shared his podium time before theCourt with Reconstruction Finance Corporation general counsel Stanley F. Reed. SeeNorman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 272-78 (1935) (noting Reed's oral
argument and summarizing the brief for the U.S. and the RFC). On February 18, theCourt decided the cases in the government's favor by a 5-4 vote. See id. at 240-42(upholding the June 5, 1933, Joint Resolution of Congress that had nullified "gold
clauses"-provisions giving obligees contractual rights to be paid in U.S. gold coin-in private contractual provisions); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 317 (1935)(upholding the power of the U.S Treasury to compel "gold certificate" owners to
surrender them for currency, not gold specie); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330,331-32 (1935) (holding that owners of U.S. bonds payable in gold may be paid in
currency, even if gold is more valuable than the obligation of the bond).
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way through and eventually it would work out that
way; he appointed me.
He was Roosevelt's first appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1937, which was a rather
startling event to much of the legal world. I think
most people did not think of him as the ideal
candidate, that after four or five years of no
appointments Roosevelt would pick him as the
first.
When I arrived in the summer of 1954, he
had been there seventeen years and was the Senior
Associate Justice. He ended up serving thirty-four
years on the Court. He was a great person to work
for, very personable, friendly, amiable, warm,
willing to engage his law clerks in a lot of very
heated but friendly disputations over issues and
what not, and it was a grand experience.
As far as the subject of this panel goes,
Brown II, I'm not going to be able to add a whole
lot here because Justice Black never discussed the
case, and this was true the previous year leading
up to Brown . I talked about this over the years
with his two clerks from that year, one of whom
was David Vann, who later became mayor of
Birmingham and the other was Charlie Reich, who
gained fame later as the author of The Greening of
America.[51] They actually lived at Black's house
for that year and he never discussed the case with
them at all, and they never saw a piece of paper
relating to it. It was as though it did not exist, and
the same carried through in my year there-he just
did not discuss the case. So I am not going to be
able to add a whole lot, but I'm delighted to be
here.
Moderator: You're understating your contribution, as time will
prove. The silence of Justice Black was not, I
51 CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970). Reich wrote this book,
which was the nationwide non-fiction best seller, when he was a Professor at Yale
Law School. See generally Thomas Meehan, The Yale Faculty Makes the Scene, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1971 (Magazine), at 12-13, 48-52.
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think, a personal foible. It was part of the context
in which Chief Justice Warren and the Associate
Justices handled the Brown litigation as a very
confidential matter, even within the confidentiality
of the Court. Earl and Barrett, you were there for
that first year. Could you describe that dynamic of
secrecy, delicacy, and so forth?
Well, I think a good example of it is the fact that
some law clerks did not know that Brown was
coming down.
The decision day?
On decision day, yes. It was very confidential and
there were strict orders from the top that it was
not to be discussed with anybody; the clerks who
were working on it were not to discuss it with their
wives or anybody else. So I'm not sure exactly why
it was-this was not, after all, a national security
case or something. I'm not sure why the Chief
Justice was so adamant about it, but Earl could
tell you about that.
What was your impression as to how many clerks
were actually working on the case in any way at
all?
Well, on the decree there was a committee of six of
us who worked on the decree. But for the main
opinion, I never did know exactly how many
worked on it and how many didn't. I did, only
because of Jackson giving me his unpublished
opinion.
The decision of the Court to maintain such secrecy
was probably stimulated by Warren himself, who
was very much concerned about newspaper leaks.
The Justices agreed that none of the clerks, other
than the Chiefs own clerks, would be involved in
any way. Several of the Justices, as we know,
honored that agreement only in the breach and
there were Justices like Jackson who, I think,
shared his views with Barrett. But I'm not even
sure if it was true in Frankfurter's chambers.
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There was a good deal of emphasis on
maintaining security. For example, the usual
routine in the Court is that every draft of an
opinion that is going to be distributed to the
Justices is sent down to the Supreme Court's own
print shop, and the drafts then are distributed to
the Justices in printed form-galleys, as they are
sometimes called. In this instance, that was ruled
out. Everything was done in typed form. In
addition, even messengers were kept out of this.
When the time came in early May, 1954, to
distribute the first draft of Brown I, Warren
personally delivered copies to each Justice in the
building. He personally took a copy to Justice
Jackson in the hospital. And another clerk and I
personally delivered copies to Justice Minton at his
apartment and to Justice Black, who was playing
tennis at the time when we arrived at his
Alexandria home.
The security was regarded as very, very
important and in the Chiefs office we were
repeatedly admonished that this was not
something that we were to discuss with other law
clerks. That in itself would be quite unusual,
because the normal procedure would be that at
lunch or in private conferences, there would be a
good deal of interchange among clerks about "What
do you think about this?" or "Do you think that
draft is good?" and so on. Not so in Brown I.
Meador: Let me ask you about that. You know, we had the
clerks' private dining room-downstairs, where the
eighteen of us gathered most days for lunch, my
recollection is-and you can correct me on this-I
never recall hearing this case discussed at lunch
with the clerks.
Pollock: I'm not surprised because I know the Chiefs clerks
would have been absolutely silent in any such
discussion and probably might have even gone so
far as to say that any discussion of that sort is out
of bounds.
Is that your memory of the lunchroom also?
2005]
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Yes. Big difference. Big difference.
Brown I was the one with the great secrecy. Now,
just a footnote, not of personal knowledge, but a
footnote to Earl's comments. In those chambers of
Justices who had trouble with Brown I, including
Justice Reed, Justice Jackson, and Justice Clark to
some degree-I was not there, so this is second-
hand knowledge-but in those chambers, there
was a good deal of interchange between the Justice
and the law clerk. That was not true of the other
Justices who were pretty well signed on originally,
so there was a good bit of that. But the same sort
of culture was on those law clerks in regard to even
those who had trouble with the decision. That's
Brown L Now, Brown II-
Brown II is the cafeteria conversation question
that Dan asked-
My recollection, subject to better memory from my
colleagues, is Brown II did not have the same type
of in terrorum culture.
You're absolutely right.
Regarding the lunch room, it is worth noting that
there is a private lunch room in the Supreme Court
building for the law clerks. Fortunately, they test
it for bugs and sound every day-it's a good thing,
because if you had a tape recorder in that lunch
room, goodness knows what would happen to this
country.
Well, I want to make sure we're clear on this, Dan.
Your memory of that lunch room during the Brown
H year, which is the year you were employed as a
law clerk, is that this was not a lunch room topic.
I do not recall ever having heard it discussed. Now
my memory may be faulty and I'd be happy to be
corrected, but I do not recall any discussion in the
lunch room of the case.
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If I could drop a footnote to one thing that you said,
Justice Jackson did not have trouble with the
result. He had a lot of trouble with how they were
going to get there and what they were going to say.
That is also true of Reed. Reed had no trouble with
the result. He certainly believed that Plessy should
be overruled, but it was a question of how and
when.
Certainly he was there by May 17, 1954. They
were all unanimously part of that decision.
I want to start at that moment, or maybe
the next day. The morning after Brown v. Board of
Education, two of you are law clerks and two of you
are about to be law clerks, but you're on the
outside. Let's start on the outside: What was your
sense of what this meant for the country and for
the Court that you would be working at during this
next year?
Well, of course, I was in the Korean War in JAG at
that time and it wasn't at the top of our agenda,
but we were all delighted, enthralled. I mean, no
one disagreed with the basic decision-that is, my
colleagues, friends, and lawyers-so that part of it
was very easy. It wasn't until I got to the Court-
you had to fully get into it to find out what all the
problems were.
Back to Barrett's point about Justice
Jackson, it was true of Reed also, to a slightly
different degree. His concern-which brings up
Brown I-was not so much the decision that
separate but equal had to go. It was the question
of when and how, and he was more interested, or
more concerned with how than anything else. I'm
sure a lot of the other Justices had this problem.
Having made the decision in Brown I, that
all public schools had to be desegregated, it was
very much like, in my opinion, the dog chasing the
ambulance: he catches the tire and finally gets
hold of it and doesn't know what to do with it. Not
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that they didn't know what to do with it, but they
didn't know how exactly to do it. So I would say
that really Brown II had a lot more difficulties in a
way-not controversy between Justices
particularly, or antagonisms like Brown I did-but
there was a great concern among all the Justices
on, now that we have caught the tire, what do we
do with it, and how do we make this thing work?
And I think they were all concerned with that. I
know Justice Reed had more concern with how
than he did with Brown I. He was more concerned
and more fearful of what possibilities could occur if
it was not done properly-insurrections, strikes,
bloodshed, all types of horrors if it were done
badly.
Don't forget that the briefs ranged all the way from
plaintiffs who were asking for immediate, complete
action-desegregate now, we are entitled to our
rights, you have said we have constitutional rights,
you don't spread them out, you don't delay them-
all the way to South Carolina and Florida and a
couple of other states, which were in effect
thumbing their nose at the Court, both at oral
argument and in the briefs, indicating that nothing
may ever happen. [5 2]
Dan, from the outside, as your clerkship was
approaching, before the Court reached this
decision, what was your sense of what the Court
had bitten off and what this Brown II process was
really about?
It opened up to me a sort of chasm, to see how this
thing was going to be carried out and implemented
and what the impact was going to be. The
enormity of the thing is what immediately
impressed me. I just had difficulty foreseeing how
it would all work out.
52 See Kurland & Casper, supra note 32 (reproducing these briefs and oral
argument transcripts).
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Moderator: Obviously you were a student at Harvard Law
School, but were you getting a direct feel for the
Alabama reaction to Brown v. Board of Education?
Meador: Of course, as you say, I was at Harvard Law School
at that moment, but I went back to Alabama that
summer between the end of the academic year and
arriving with Justice Black, and there obviously
was enormous upset and objection to it down there,
although as I look back, that summer was
relatively quiescent on the subject. It was as
though they were waiting for the other shoe to drop
with Brown II. But there was enormous objection
to it, basically-I mean I didn't learn of anybody
who approved of it in Alabama.
Pollock: I think my perception is just a little bit different. I
think the other shoe was already in the air,
perhaps at the time that Brown I was decided.
Unanimity of the Court was absolutely essential in
the view of the Chief Justice and I think in the
view of the other Justices of the Court. In fact, I
think it was the need for unanimity that Warren
exploited with Justices like Reed in order to induce
them to join in Brown I, and they would not have
done so-clearly in my mind-unless it had
already been determined by the Justices that the
decree would be implemented on a gradual basis. I
don't think there ever would have been a
unanimous decision unless there was already a
clear understanding that that is the way it would
have to be done-because of fear of violence, school
closings, fear of the Court issuing orders that they
could not enforce, and fear that the prestige of the
Court in that event would take a terrific licking.
There really-as I saw it-were three issues
in the Brown litigation: One, is separate but equal
to be accepted? Second, is desegregation to be done
on a gradual basis? Third, what are the
instructions to give to the district courts in
carrying out gradual transition? In my mind, the
first two issues were determined in the '53-'54
Term, leaving only the determination of what
instructions to give to the district courts.
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Prettyman:
As far as I understood it, there was not any
chance whatsoever that the Court would ever issue
a "forthwith" decree. I don't think it was ever
seriously considered by anyone. A footnote on that
is that Black took the position that desegregation
of the South would probably never take place, and
so he thought the Court in Brown II should exclude
any reference to class actions and should only
order admission of the handful of named plaintiffs.
And that was really the only change that was made
in the Chief Justice's draft of Brown II that was
circulated to the other Justices.
There was an added factor that came in here that
was not apparent, I don't think-certainly in our
chambers at the time of the original decision. I
had always naively assumed that people went to
school because they were in a school district that
was like a congressional district, with clearly
drawn lines except without the gerrymandering,
and that you went to the school within your
district, and that therefore it was going to be a
relatively simple thing to readjust that. But
during the work that I did on the committee of six,
I discovered that there were at least five different
methods of deciding where you went to school,
including all the way from open choice to strict
districting to loose districting with lines
intercrossing, and some areas being determined by
where the railroad track ran or a stream ran. And
it became quite clear that there was no way that
you were going to write a decree that was going to
tell each district judge how to work all this out
because, for example, you had to have the entire
bus structure redone. You had to have, in many
cases, the legislature dealing with new tax
systems, because many Negro sections were taxed
differently than white sections. School boards-
you had to figure out what to do. And what about
teachers? What were you going to do to support
them?-you're talking about students, but what
about the teachers? Were you having Negro
teachers now teaching classes that were largely
white but not entirely? How are you going to deal
with all this? And that's part of what our memos
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dealt with to the Court, which I guess you're going
to come to in a minute.
That's the topic I want to go to next. Earl really
has introduced it a bit with a helpfully direct and I
think provocative statement that Brown II is a bit
of an anticlimax or a fait accompli given Brown I.
I wouldn't want to understate the importance of
the issues that had to be decided as to how it
should be implemented and how the district courts
should decide this. Those were very significant
issues. But I don't think that the Court really had
on its internal agenda, at that time, such issues as
"Should there be 'forthwith' admission?," or
"Should there not be forthwith admission?" There
had been essentially a commitment to people like
Reed, Clark and others who were desperately
concerned-
Frankfurter?
Yes, Frankfurter-who were desperately concerned
about how it was going to be implemented. There
was a commitment that was, I think, unshakeable
that the implementation would be done on a
gradual basis. And then there were these
important additional questions: "Okay, it's going
to be done on a gradual basis; now how do we try to
direct the district courts to carry out this very
awesome task?"
The Justices tended to leave Washington during
parts of their summer recess, and the summer of
1954 included the creation of the committee of law
clerks that went to work on Brown II. A couple of
you were a part of that process and a couple of you
were not. What kinds of instructions or
conversations do you recall with your Justices as
that summer was moving forward?
Davidson: Let's talk about the "Committee of Six" for a
minute, which has a little interesting history.
Justice Reed was more concerned, as I said earlier,
with what would happen after you overruled Plessy
20051
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than with overruling Plessy. That was not his big
problem. His big problem was how we do it and
when we do it. And there's no question that Chief
Justice Warren was the guy who got unanimity in
the Court, and I want to give him credit for that on
the way by. He absolutely got it in both Brown I
and Brown II and he deserves a tremendous
amount of credit.
But let's go to the committee. Back before
they argued Brown I, Reed became very fascinated,
according to Jack Fassett, my predecessor clerk,
with what has happened in other places that had
had desegregation, so he had Fassett and probably
his other clerk, a fellow named George Mickum,
start doing research on places that had this
problem, and he began to collect through the clerks
a tremendous amount of material. In the summer,
after the decision of Brown I, he suggested to Jack
Fassett, the clerk who was my predecessor, who
broke me in, so to speak, that he take this material
to the Chief Justice and show him what he had
collected-it was a great bulk of work.[53] Well,
Warren took it very gracefully and wanted it and
read it. Shortly after that, Barrett, is when the
Chief Justice appointed the six of us. I was one.
You were one- I don't remember; Earl, were you
one?
Pollock: No, I wasn't.
Davidson: Well, there were six of us, a clerk from each of six
Justices-he didn't take two from any one Justice.
Moderator: So basically your bosses volunteered you up-
Davidson: Absolutely. There was no question about that.
There's no appeal. (Laughter). I mean, he said
"Go," and you went. So we started work and we
divided up our workload and so on and so forth.
53 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW
DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 576-77.
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Then we go to Barrett's final point, to speed
things up: Having done all this work- I
remember I had Cairo, Illinois. I remember that
distinctly, because of Cairo not being in one of the
southern states, but one that had problems similar
to the south. The Ford Foundation came out with
a book then-they had endowed a writer to collect
material on places that had had desegregation:
What were their problems? What did they run
into? [54]
So we worked and worked and worked and
worked and we had- I don't know, would you say
it was that high [indicating with his hand a three-
foot-tall stack of paper]?
Prettyman: We had a lot of material.
Davidson: We had more material, and I don't know whatever




It's in various archives, I think. One piece of this
project was a study of many maps. I think that
was part of preparing-
My job was to try to show where Negroes and
whites lived in particular areas. The principal
map, for example, was of Spartanburg, South
Carolina. There weren't many maps like that
around, but I was able to get a number of them,
because by showing where the homes were and
where the schools were, you could get some idea of
how much relocation and so forth there would be if
you actually desegregated. So I did a memo for the
Court which was seen by all the Justices, and they
signed off on it, on the point of the maps. The
principal point made was the one I mentioned a
few minutes ago, that there were a lot of different
systems going on out there and a lot of different
problems to deal with.
54 The book is HARRY ASHMORE, THE NEGRO & THE SCHOOLS (1954). See
generally KLUGER, supra note 14, at 720-21.
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Gordon, in your piece of this work, which I think
was part of what Justice Frankfurter among others
had suggested to Chief Justice Warren, a study of
how northern locales had done their desegregation
efforts-
Frankfurter was very interested in the work of the
clerks. He stayed in Washington during part of the
summer and that's when we were doing our work.
He was very interested in that and had some
participation in that. He didn't try to guide us in
any way, but he was very interested and very
much in favor of it. As was Reed-Reed thought
we ought to gather as much information as we
possibly could.
Back to Earl's point, there is no question
that what he said is exactly correct-that is, there
is no way you could have gotten unanimity
without, and now I come to the great phrase, "all
deliberate speed." That was a phrase that I think
Earl Warren sold to most of the other Justices. At
least it was what they wanted-what Frankfurter
wanted, what Reed wanted-not the words, but I
mean the principle. I'm using the words to
introduce the point.
Now I think we ought to bring it up a little
bit to today. I thought, in my naive way, that it
was a wonderful order. I liked it. I thought "all
deliberate speed" and the way the Chief Justice
had phrased it and so forth-I'm talking about
Brown II-was really what needed to be done.
That's from the background of knowing what my
Justice wanted, knowing what some of the other
Justices wanted, knowing what the country could
tolerate, and I thought, "Boy, the old guys have got
it."
Well, you know, there has been so much emphasis
on that phrase that I think you forget that it is
preceded by this language that really explained
what the Court had in mind: "The courts"-
meaning the district courts--"will require that the
defendants make a prompt and reasonable start
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toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954,
ruling. Once such a start has been made, the
courts may find that additional time is necessary to
carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The
burden rests upon the defendants to establish that
such time is necessary in the public interest and is
consistent with good faith compliance at the
earliest practicable date."[55 ] That's the key.
Davidson: I really appreciate you bringing that up. I used
that term only to introduce this point, because that
language is probably more important than "all
deliberate speed," which grabbed the public's
interest.
Meador: May I interject to comment on a point Earl made a
moment ago about Justice Black? He told me a
couple of years later in a conversation that he
thought at the time of Brown II, as Earl
mentioned, that the Court should have ordered
immediate admission of the named plaintiffs on a
non-segregated basis to the schools. Obviously he
did not prevail on that point, and I don't know how
hard he pressed it at the time. But two years later,
he still was of that view.
There is another aspect I would like to
mention. I recall a conversation with him shortly
after the Brown II decision came down, and he told
me that what he was most worried about in this
whole situation was that a lot of district judges
across the South would be issuing injunctions
against school board members and others and then
they would bring them up on contempt charges and
try them for contempt without a jury. Black
believed, contrary to what the law was, that there
was a right to trial by jury on a criminal contempt
charge,[ 56] and-
Pollock: Probably stemming from his labor days.
55 Brown II, 349 U.S. 249, 300 (1955).
56 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting);
see also Daniel J. Meador, Justice Black and His Law Clerks, supra note 13, at 59.
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-he was fearful that he would see a rampant
violation of that right, as he saw it, across the
South, trying people without a jury.
Let me just for a minute go back to the point which
brings this up to date. The language that Barrett
read is as important, or more important, than "all
deliberate speed." But I'm trying to go back and
say the way we looked at it then. I felt that the
Court had done a great service in that it had gotten
unanimity, we had gotten the ball rolling, we'd
taken the cork out of the bottle, Plessy was gone,
there were equal rights for people-we'd all done a
wonderful thing. Since that time-fifty years---"all
deliberate speed" has become a bad phrase in many
circles.
Well, that's because so little has been done in some
parts-
Well, regardless of the reasons- I thought what
the Court was doing was correct. You all could
differ, but I thought it was correct, and I left the
Court after my term saying, "Boy, I'm glad I was a
part of this." Now I read this stuff that we should
have done this and we should have done that-I
say "we," but I mean the Court-they should have
done maybe what Black wanted, or they should
have put rules on having to desegregate within a
certain time frame or in a certain way. Let me say
this: in my own personal opinion, it has not
worked the way I hoped it would. I thought, and I
think the Court felt, that there would be more
support in the South, as well as in the nation, to
say, "Okay, now this is where we're going. This is
the path we're going to take." In the South,
particularly, there were serious problems. I come
from a border state, but it's more south than it is
north. And we had our problems in Louisville. We
had riots-not anything like in some other places,
but we had bad things happen. The people didn't
get behind this thing and really help press it
forward-
[Vol. 79:823
LAW CLERKS RECALL BROWN II
Pollock: I think the people who really should have gotten
behind it were the other two branches of the
federal government. And it was only with the
enactment of the two Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1965-
Moderator: Ten years later.
Pollock: -that the federal government really put muscle
behind what the Court had said in Brown I and
sought to accomplish in Brown II. It is true-
Prettyman: Even Eisenhower showed disdain for it.
Pollock: Right. He even was quoted as saying that he
thought Brown was a mistake[57] and with that,
57 At his press conference just two days after the Court announced Brown I,
President Eisenhower gave these extemporaneous responses to reporter questions
about the decision:
Q. Mr. President, do you have any advice to give the South as to just how
to react to this recent Supreme Court decision banning segregation,
sir?
A. Not in the slightest. I thought that [South Carolina] Governor [James
F.] Byrnes made a very fine statement when he said, "Let's be calm
and let's be reasonable and let's look this thing in the face." The
Supreme Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold the
constitutional processes in this country; and I will obey.
Q. Mr. President, one more question. Do you think this decision has put
Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Byrd [Senator Harry F. Byrd (D.-VA)] and other
Southern leaders who supported the Republican ticket in 1952 on the
political hotspot, so to speak, since it [the Brown I decision] was
brought out under the Republican administration?
A. The Supreme Court, as I understand it, is not under any
administration.
Q. A question along that same line, sir, do you expect that this ruling will,
however, alienate many of your Southern supporters politically?
A. This is all I will say: I have stood, so far as I know, for honest, decent
government since I was first mentioned as a political figure. I am still
standing for it, and they will have to make their own decisions as to
whether they decide that I have got any sense or haven't.
The President's News Conference of May 19, 1954, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 489-90 (1954). President Eisenhower also
reportedly reprimanded his appointee Chief Justice Warren privately during this
same period, at a White House dinner, for the Brown I decision: "I thought I would
never have to say this to you," Eisenhower was heard to tell Warren, "but I now find
it necessary to say to you specifically: You mind your business, and I'll mind mine."
Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990 (Magazine), reprinted in




when that word got out, it didn't exactly help with
the implementation.
On the subject of the words "all deliberate
speed," I think there are some misconceptions.
One is the notion that if those words hadn't been
used, implementation would have been more rapid.
I don't think so.
Davidson: I don't either.
Pollock: I don't think it would've made any difference at all.
I think the critics of the decision have simply
seized upon that phrase as a way of saying that the
Court didn't show the sufficient degree of militancy
or strength in its implementation decision.
And the other misconception, I think, is
that many critics will blame "all deliberate speed"
for the fact that Negro students have not achieved
equal educational opportunities or that we have
not achieved a racial balance in our schools. I
think that is a misconception based on a
misunderstanding of what the Brown decision was
all about. It was not designed to achieve equality
of educational opportunities. It was not designed
to achieve racial balance. It was designed to end
legally imposed segregation of the races in the
public schools. It was not intended to be a panacea
for all of the terrible problems that we had then
and, to a great extent, we may still have today in
achieving not only legal equality, but educational
equality, social equality, and equality in other
respects as well. So to some extent, the words "all
deliberate speed" have become demonized, as if to
say if only the Court hadn't used those three
words, everything would have been different. That
simply does not reflect reality.
Meador: Let me say I agree fully with that. If I can go back
and pick up this point, unlike Gordon, I was not
surprised with what happened thereafter. I
assumed enormous opposition and upset and so on.
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Moderator:
Prettyman:
Along that line, LBJ, President Johnson,
made a comment once that I thought was quite
thought-provoking. He said that we got things
turned around the wrong way. The first steps
should have been the passage of the Voting Rights
Act and the political changes that brought about.
He didn't go and spell it out, but what he, I think,
intended to say is that the political change brought
about by that Act would have resulted eventually
in the elimination of segregation, at least in most
places, or in many places, and so you would have a
political solution to the problem, which might have
been better for the country in the long run. But
I've often pondered over that scenario-if that had
happened that way, what the Supreme Court's role
might have been ultimately in it, it might have
been much less than it was.
At this point, I'd like to take a short break. What
you gentlemen have done, much more effectively
than I could have hoped for, is to wrap your arms
around not only the story of Brown II, but also the
question of its legacy. After a short break, we'll
return to some of that.
Welcome back to Lenna Theater at
Chautauqua Institution. Let's finish up our
discussion of the law clerks' committee. Barrett
Prettyman, of course you were a participant in
that-
I was just going to say, as an aside, that I have
thought ever since that time fifty years ago, it's
been quite extraordinary that there has been so
little comment about the fact that here you had a
committee working inside the courthouse, getting
its own evidence together, submitting memos,
factual and otherwise, to the Court, without
anybody, any party to the Court- Bill Coleman,
who is here today, was there then as an NAACP
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lawyer[ 58] and he will know that at the time,
nobody outside the Court, I think, knew that all of
this evidence was being gathered and being
presented to the Court. Since it's become known,
there has been no comment about it. The parties
had no chance to critique it or either defend it or
attack it. It is most extraordinary.
Maybe that's because it didn't reflect at all in the
Brown II opinion. There's nothing to suggest, with
all due respect, that you'd done any work.(Laughter)
That's what he's complaining about. (Laughter)
There was certainly no reference to it, but I do
think it had a very important effect. I think it's
one of the things that convinced the Court that (a)
desegregation had to take place over a period of
time, and (b) the district courts had to be allowed a
good deal of leeway in how they were going to
handle it. I think our memo was directly
responsible for at least part of that.
There again, I think you have to give credit to the
Chief Justice who instituted the committee of six.
Even though Reed had started it several years
before-before my day-for his own purposes and
then had Jack Fassett take it to the Chief at Reed's
request, the Chief fell in love with it, so to speak,
as an idea, and then he augmented it, so he
deserves the credit for really following through
with it and distributing it to the other Justices.
Earl, do you know-you were in the Chiefs
chambers, and he was the recipient of this work
58 William T. Coleman, Jr., a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and
Harvard Law School, a law clerk to Justice Frankfurter during the Supreme Court's
October Term 1948, Secretary of Transportation during the Ford Administration
and today Senior Counselor at O'Melveny & Myers, during the 1950s was a key
member of Thurgood Marshall's NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund team
working on desegregation cases including Brown. He was present in the audience on
May 18, 2005, for this roundtable discussion and gave the keynote lecture that
evening in Chautauqua Institution's Athenaeum Hotel at a dinner commemorating
the 50th anniversary of Brown II.
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product-how he used it? Was he unrolling maps
and looking at Spartanburg's residential patterns?
I do not recall that. I think that he obviously gave
a good deal of consideration to it. My memory does
not permit me to recall any specific recollection
about that.
Let's move into the fall of 1954. One thing that
was happening, literally down the street from the
Supreme Court building, was the District of
Columbia schools were implementing integration.
It included some protests, riots, police crowd
control, and so forth.[59] Was that something that
the Court was aware of, or were you hermetically
sealed in and concentrating on the event in the
building?
Well, the Justices read the newspapers, some of
them avidly, and they were well aware of what was
going on. And they would get reports from friends
around the country, they'd get mail and so forth. I
think they were well aware of what was going on,
both on their doorstep and elsewhere.
Of course, the Court knew that the desegregation
in the District of Columbia had already started
even before Brown I.
In the fall, as the Court was about to begin its
Term, it scheduled the Brown II case for oral
argument in December 1954. Within weeks,
Justice Jackson died and that schedule went out
the window. What are your memories of that
process-the scheduling, Jackson's death and what
59 When the 1954 school year began in the District of Columbia, high school
students were surprised to discover that the Board of Education had, unannounced,
opened previously all-white high schools to many more than the few Negro students
the whites had been led to expect as classmates. In response, over 2000 white
students at Anacostia High School, McKinley Technical High School, Eastern
Junior-Senior High School, and six junior high schools went on "strike"-they
refused to attend classes, and some marched on the Board of Education building
downtown. See Bess Furman, Student Strikes Widen in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1954, at 20; Some Pupils Demonstrate to Protest Integration, WASH. POST & TIMES
HERALD, Oct. 5, 1954, at 25.
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that did to this decision dynamic? Barrett
Prettyman, we'll start with you-you were
Jackson's law clerk.
Well, of course, Justice Harlan was actually
appointed very quickly, but-
Nominated.
Sorry. Right. Exactly. Big difference. And we all
assumed, since he had been a very prominent New
York attorney with a large firm and then on the
Second Circuit, that he would very quickly be
confirmed and we were all surprised that it took, I
guess, four months or so. There were all kinds of
objections raised, but as I've already indicated, he
and I were in touch immediately. He wanted work
to start right away on the decree. He wanted to get
up to speed and he did-I think he spent much
time on it from then on until the actual vote at
conference, getting up to speed on those cases.
Harlan's grandfather had been a Justice of the
Court and most famously was the lone dissenting
Justice in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.[60] Certainly
that couldn't have been the reason why President
Eisenhower selected him. But that did become
part of the dynamic, didn't it, in the confirmation
process given the Brown climate that surrounded
the Court?
The big objection to Harlan, as I recall it, was that
he was accused of being a One-Worlder. He
belonged to an organization called the Atlantic
Union, as I recall, and he'd been put on the board
which advocated a sort of North American
cooperation among nations, etc. etc. He said in his
hearings that he had never attended a meeting of
it and he was ashamed to say that he had never
even paid his dues and so on.[61] That was a big
60 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61 See Nomination of John M. Harlan, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 136-37 (1955) (testimony of Judge John M. Harlan), reprinted
in 6 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARING & REPORTS ON
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point of discussion, as I recall it, during the
confirmation phase.
Do you think it would be filibustered today?
He had a sizeable vote against him.[62] I was
sitting in the gallery of the Senate the night
Harlan was confirmed and heard the closing
debates. I remember I went back to the chambers
at the Court and called Justice Black at home to
tell him that Harlan had been confirmed. I was
mildly surprised at his lack of reaction-it was as
though I told him I might be around late tomorrow
morning. He showed no particular excitement or
interest in the nature of the call. I was rather
disappointed. I thought I was giving him some
exciting news.
Well, don't you think that was because he
anticipated that Justice Harlan would have a
number of views that were contrary to his, which
turned out to be true?
Yet in the end they turned out to be very warm
friends.
Oh, yes.
There was a good bit of criticism, too, from a
political standpoint that of all the times in the
world, to appoint a Harlan, Eisenhower did not use
good political judgment in nominating another
John Marshall Harlan right in the midst of this
Brown v. Board situation. It was a minor type of
thing-it was the kind of thing that Rush
Limbaugh would have egged on. And it was sort of
ironic that the grandson of the great dissenter in
SUCCESSFUL & UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-72 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein
eds., 1975).
62 The Senate confirmed Harlan on March 16, 1955. Eleven Senators, including
nine Southern Democrats, voted against him, and twenty-eight Senators did not vote
at all. See Rose McKee, Harlan Is Approved for Supreme Court, WASH. POST &







the Plessy case was put on the Court to, in effect,
overrule-he wasn't on when they overruled it, but
he was there to second the motion and to work on
the mandate. So it was kind of an ironic quirk of
fate-of all the people who could have been
appointed, that he appointed the grandson of theJustice who said originally that Plessy was a
mistake. You have to go back in history and kind
of say, "What if?"-if Harlan the grandfather had
been in the majority, you would not have had
Brown because you would not have needed Brown.
To go back to your point about the beginning of theTerm, the huge dramatic news was Jackson's
sudden death. My recollection, here's a human
interest footnote, is that the law clerks attended
his funeral service in the National Cathedral in abody. We sat together, as I recall it, in the balcony
of the north transept for that service. Then all of
the Justices went on up here to New York for theburial. Then the Court operated as an eight-man
Court for about four or five months while Harlan's
confirmation was pending. He was finally
confirmed in the middle of March, so most of the
time it was an eight Justice Court.
That also, of course, was a mid-term election year,
and this volatile issue was perhaps a concern to
voters. Were the Justices concerned about dealing
with this controversial issue during the mid-term
election year?
I think that had part to do with the scheduling,
from what I've read. You may know, Earl-it mayhave been a discussion in your chambers. But I
think that some have said that the scheduling
thought was not only the death of Justice Jackson
and the appointment, or the failure to confirm
immediately, Harlan, but also the fact that it was a
mid-term election, that they wanted to wait until
that was over before they had the hearings on
Brown II. Whether that is true or not I don't know,
but it makes sense that it would be.
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Once Harlan was confirmed and the Court was
back up to nine members, it was the winter, early
spring of 1955 and the Brown II case was active
again. It was scheduled for oral argument in April.
The briefs came in, and it was an enormous pile of
briefs. Did you have responsibility to review,
summarize and deal with the briefing?
Well, I've already mentioned that I summarized all
of them for Justice Harlan-fifty pages.
Yes. We reviewed them.
Were there surprises in the briefing? The four
states, of course, that were involved in the cases
filed briefs. Other states filed their own briefs.
The Eisenhower Administration filed its brief. And
of course the plaintiffs filed their final briefs.
I was more surprised by the oral arguments than I
was with the briefs.
I was too, and somewhat shocked. Now I may have
been a naive, young somebody who was easily
shocked, but I remember it vividly, the argument
of J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., the Attorney General of
Virginia. He later became governor, I suppose on
the basis of the way he argued the case, which was
one of the most horrible things I've ever heard. He
had many points, but one of his major points was
that you should not order any immediate
integration.
That's an important point, too, if I might
make a side remark. Justice Reed was always very
certain that he understood-I think it was more for
his own benefit than for anybody else-that the
Brown case was desegregation; it was not
integration. There was never-
The whole bussing thing and so forth came much









It was very important to those guys who were
having troubles with the case to say it'sdesegregation, we're not commanding integration.
If I could interrupt you for a moment on that, it's
instructive that neither of the Brown opinions uses
the word "integration."
Absolutely not.
In fact, in Brown II, one of the things I remember
about it-I was in the courtroom when Chief
Justice Warren read the opinion of Brown II-is
that a half dozen times or more, the word
"discrimination" was used, and never was the word"segregation" or "desegregation" used in the
opinion. So I went back right after Warren read it
and saw Justice Black in his chambers, and I
commented on this point. I said, "I noticed you
used the word "discrimination" throughout the
opinion. It never mentioned 'segregation' or
'desegregation,' which is what Brown is really all
about, and I'm a little puzzled over that." All that
Black did was to smile slightly and say, "Well, I
think they'll understand what we mean."
Let's return to the oral argument of J. Lindsay
Almond. What did he do that's so shocking?
What was shocking to me was that a major thrust
of his argument was that the courts should not
order integration or rapid desegregation, however
you want to phrase it, because, among other
reasons, the trouble with the blacks' health, their
criminal records, their lack of intelligence, or lack
of learning, or inability to learn. I particularly
remember-and this was late in the afternoon;
nobody else seems to remember this, so maybe I'mdreaming-he stood before the Court and there
was a little light coming through- It was a verydramatic scene from my standpoint; Almond looked
like he was from Central Casting, with absolutely
perfect white hair, perfectly coiffed. And he said,
"And I must state that venereal disease among theblacks is so much greater than the whites. There's
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tuberculosis and unwed mothers," but he kept
going back to the venereal disease and "to put
these children together is a mistake at this time."
I just cringed in that great hall of justice to hear
that type of argument being made-[
63]
Prettyman: The two who shocked me the most were the fellow
from South Carolina, Emory Rogers, and a fellow
from North Carolina, Beverly Lake, because they
were in effect telling the Court that it had no
power in this area. They were still arguing Brown
. And at one point, the Chief-I remember he was
shocked-said to one of them, "Are you trying to
tell me that you will not obey the order of this
63 It actually was Archibald G. Robertson, representing the Prince Edward
County, Virginia, School Board, who made the "venereal disease" argument 
to the
Justices during the April 12 afternoon session of the Brown II oral argument. 
His
full statement on this issue was follows:
We are not aware of any unfairness or inequality and we are 
not
responsible for that. We say that the standards of health and morals must
also be taken into account. Tuberculosis is almost twice as prevalent among
the Negroes as it is among the whites. Negroes constitute 22 percent of the
population of Virginia, but 78 percent of all cases of syphilis and 83 percent
of all cases of gonorrhea occur among the Negroes. One white child out of
50 born in Virginia is illegitimate. One Negro child out of 5 is illegitimate.
Of course, the incidence of disease and illegitimacy is just a drop in the
bucket compared to the promiscuity. We say that not as a moral issue, not
as to where the fault lies, but that the fact is there and the white parents 
at
this time will not appropriate the money to put their children among other
children with that sort of a background. That is just one of the factors of life
with which we are confronted.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliott (No. 2) and Davis v. County School
Board of Prince Edward Co. (No. 4), Supreme Court of the United States, Apr. 12,
1955, at 38, 43-44 [hereinafter Transcript], reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra
note 32, at 1180, 1185-86. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., the Attorney General of Virginia,
who followed Mr. Robertson to the podium, did not mention venereal 
diseases
explicitly, but he referred back to and reiterated such claims:
Regardless of why, and as to any other reason, it is a fact that these great
differences [in reading comprehension test scores between Negro and white
students in Virginia schools] do exist. And these are not intangibles; they
are measurable. They are substantially the same variations as turn up year
after year by race in the county and city schools. These realities cannot 
be
ignored. I am not going further into the matter of health. Mr. Robertson
brought it out, but with the same drinking fountain, the same toilets, the
same physical daily habits and all, our problem is increased. The
conclusion, as a result of these conditions with reference to health, is
inescapable: that white parents will keep their children out of school; they
will withdraw their support. I do not say that as a threat.
Transcript, supra, at 52, reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 32, at 
1194.
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Court?" And the answer was not quite, "That's
what I'm saying," but he said it in a way that
strongly implied, "We aren't going to integrate."
Pollock: I believe it was Rogers who was asked by the Chief
Justice, "You mean to tell me that you're not
prepared to make an honest effort to desegregate?"
And Rogers replied, "Well, let's get honest out of
there." The Chief Justice replied, "No, let's keep it
right in there." He was outraged. [64]
64 The full exchange between Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Rogers on these
points during the Brown IIoral argument was as follows:
Chief Justice Warren: Is your request for an open decree predicated uponthe assumption that your school district will immediately undertake to
conform to the opinion of this Court of last year and to the decree, or is it on
the basis-
Mr. Rogers: Mr. Chief Justice, to say we will conform depends on the decreehanded down. I am frank to tell you, right now in our district I do not thinkthat we will send-the white people of the district will send their childrento the Negro schools. It would be unfair to tell the Court that we are going
to do that. I do not think it is. But I do think that something can be worked
out. We hope so.
Warren: It is not a question of attitude; it is a question of conforming to thedecree. Is there any basis upon which we can assume that there will be animmediate attempt to comply with the decree of this Court, whatever it
may be?
Rogers: Mr. Chief Justice, I would say that we would present our problem,
as I understand it, if the decree is sent out, that we would present ourproblem to the district court, and we are in the Fourth Circuit. Our
opposition has just told this Court how the Fourth Circuit has been-hehas no fear of the Fourth Circuit. I feel we can expect the courts in theFourth Circuit and the people of the district to work out something in
accordance with your decree.
Warren: Don't you believe that the question as to whether the district will
attempt to comply should be considered in any such decree?
Rogers: Not necessarily, sir. I think that we should be left to the lower
court.
Warren: And why?
Rogers: Your Honors, we have laid down here in this Court the principle
that segregation is unconstitutional. The lower court, we feel, is the place
that the machinery should be set in motion to conform to that.
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Meador:
Davidson:
I heard all these arguments too, and I well
remember the argument you are talking about. I
had two reactions to it. One was that it was rather
poor advocacy-this was not the way to persuade
the Court to do anything you might want them to
do. The other was that however shocking or
unpleasant it might be, those people were
expressing widely-held views in their states. They
were accurately saying what the sentiment was.
Let me finish up with one thing, because we have
to give credit to Thurgood Marshall again. At the
end of all these arguments, the Court gave Justice
Marshall-then attorney Marshall-the right to
respond. He responded state by state, pretty
much. He said, "South Carolina argues this" and
"Virginia argues this." And when he got to
Virginia and Almond's argument, he stopped for a
moment. He was a handsome and impressive
figure. And he stopped for a moment and he said,
"It's very interesting to me that the Attorney
General of Virginia argues that the health, well-
being, venereal disease of the blacks prevents their
being put together with the white school children."
He stopped again and said, "Those are the same
black people who work as servants to white
Virginians, and yet their children can't go to school
together."[65] And I'll tell you, there wasn't a dry
Warren: But you are not willing to say here that there would be an honest
attempt to conform to this decree, if we did leave it to the district court?
Rogers: No, I am not. Let us get the word "honest" out of there.
Warren: No, leave it in.
Rogers: No, because I would have to tell you that right now we would not
conform; we would not send our white children to the Negro schools.
Warren: Thank you.
Transcript, supra note 63, at 25-26, reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 32,
at 1167-68. In his rebuttal argument, attorney Thurgood Marshall described this as
"hear[ing] from the Lawyer Almond: Not in his lifetime, some other place ......
Transcript at 53, Kurland & Casper at 1195.
65 Attorney Thurgood Marshall's exact words were the following:
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eye in me-I don't know about the rest of the
people, but it was a moving experience.
You've anticipated my question. Marshall, along
with the other plaintiffs' attorneys, was powerfully
and directly asking the Court for the forthwith
integration remedy that many would say logically
flows from the constitutional declaration of Brown
. These excellent attorneys, including Robert
Carter, James Nabrit, Spottswood Robinson, and
Thurgood Marshall, arguing their various cases,
were presenting that argument directly to the
Court. If I'm understanding your earlier
statements, that is the remedy that already was off
of the table in the Justices' minds. Is that correct?
Well, that's my feeling.
That's my view and-
The lawyers didn't know that. We knew that.
From a litigation strategy standpoint, I could
understand their position. I think, first of all, theNAACP had its own political problems in terms of
getting the backing of its members-and this is
pure speculation on my part-but it might well
have been impossible for the NAACP lawyers to
have taken a more modest, gradualist position.
Secondly, as a matter of litigation strategy, it's not
unusual for plaintiffs to ask in their complaints or
Now, these health theories-and again we have figures that can go any
way you want. I did not check them, because I think they are so completelyimmaterial, unless the State of Virginia either has no public health servicein its schools, or they do not know how to use it. It has always beeninteresting to me, if the Court please, from the Morgan case involvingtransportation [Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946)], that, well,
whenever Negroes are separated from other people because of race, they
always make an exception as to the Negro servants. In Virginia, it isinteresting to me that the very people that argue for this side that would
object to sending their white children to school with Negroes, are eatingfood that has been prepared, served, and almost put in their mouths by the
mothers of those children. And they do it, day in and day out. But they
cannot have the child go to school ....Transcript, supra note 63, at 54, reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 32, at
1196.
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in their ad damnums for perhaps more than they
actually expect that they're going to get, but
perhaps recognizing that that could have some
effect on what they ultimately will get.
So, I think it would be very interesting to
hear what Mr. William Coleman might comment
about that because he, I think, was one of the few
lawyers in the NAACP group that had advised
Marshall not to seek a forthwith remedy, but
instead to accept a gradualist approach.[66]
Coleman, after all, was as far as I know the only
NAACP lawyer involved in that group who had had
the experience of being a law clerk at the Supreme
Court. He perhaps had a perception of what the
Court would accept as distinguished from, let's say,
what a very good lawyer who did not have that
experience might think would be the desirable
strategy.
This is pure speculation on my part. I have
to believe that in his heart of hearts, someone as
sophisticated as Thurgood Marshall probably
recognized that he wasn't going to get that Court to
accept the forthwith remedy.
In the fine book Simple Justice by Richard Kluger,
there is a portion of a taped June 2, 1955,
conversation between Thurgood Marshall and Carl
Murphy, president of the Baltimore Afro-American,
regarding the decision in Brown II. In that
conversation, Marshall said, "you know, some
people want most of the hog, other people insist on
having the whole hog, and then there are some
people who want the hog, the hair, and the rice on
the hair. What the hell! The more I think about it,
I think it's a damned good decision!"[67]
66 For information on Coleman's background and his presence at this roundtable
discussion, see supra note 58. For a description of his 1954-55 advice to Thurgood
Marshall not to seek a Supreme Court decree ordering school desegregation
"forthwith," see KLUGER, supra note 14, at 725-26.
67 KLUGER, supra note 14, at 750.
Davidson:
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Did your Justices make any comments to you in
that post-oral argument moment, before they
retired to their conference to discuss how they were
going to vote and write this? Or was oral
argument simply something for you to take in?
Well, I'm sure that mine did, because Bill Lifland
was the other law clerk and Justice Harlan talked
to us regarding just about everything.[68] But I
don't recall. I think he went into the conference
very well prepared in terms of all the arguments
and the pros and the cons. But he was, after all,
the junior man, and I think he was prepared to go
along with anything that sounded sensible.
The only thing I remember is how angry Warren
still was about some of the arguments presented by
the states.
As I said, Justice Black never discussed the case at
all.
The Justices had their conference in April, just a
couple of days after those four days of oral
arguments. And out of that conference emerges, of
course, the unanimous decision written by Chief
Justice Warren. As you understood it as law
clerks, was there any prospect of a divided Court,
or were the Justices simply a unanimous body now
in a drafting phase?
As far as I knew, it was a fait accompli. I mean,
they had satisfied, I think, all the concerns of-
certainly Justice Reed, and I assume the other
Justices.
Earl, were there various drafts, or was the original
draft essentially-
68 William T. Lifland, a graduate of Yale University and Harvard Law School,
was a law clerk to then-Judge Harlan at the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at the time of his Supreme Court appointment. Lifland today is
Senior Counsel at Cahill Gordon & Reindel.
[Vol. 79:823






I base some of my recollection on my recent
reading preparing for this program, but
Frankfurter had a couple of suggestions which, as
we all know, was not unusual. And there were a
couple other comments, suggestions, but it was sort
of a non-event. Do you remember, Earl?
I don't know whether this occurred before the Chief
Justice's draft was circulated, by way of a private
meeting or memo with Frankfurter, or whether it
was subsequent. As far as I know, Black was the
only one who made a change in the draft that was
circulated. But Frankfurter, I believe, was the one
who proposed the use of the term "all deliberate
speed," which he apparently had found in an old
equity opinion by Holmes.
He had gotten it from a poem somewhere.
They think he got it from a poem, "The Hound of
Heaven," by an old English Catholic theologian-
type writer who used the term[ 9] and-
Frankfurter was fighting for that phrase, and
eventually he prevails on the Chief Justice to
include it very, very late in the month of May.
69 "The Hound of Heaven," written about July 1890, is the best-known work of
English poet Francis Thompson (1857-1907). It describes his futile flight from God
and, in its opening stanza, includes the phrase "deliberate speed":
I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
I fled Him, down the arches of the years;
I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
Of my own mind; and in the mist of tears
I hid from Him, and under running laughter.
Up vistaed hopes I sped;
And shot, precipitated,
Adown Titanic glooms of chasmed fears,
From those strong feet that followed, followed after.
But with unhurrying chase,
And unperturbed pace,
Deliberate speed, majestic instancy,
They beat-and a Voice beat
More instant than the Feet-
"All things betray thee, who betrayest Me."
THE POEMS OF FRANCIS THOMPSON 89 (Wilfrid Meynell ed., 1913).
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Before that time, obviously, there was a
drafting process and then circulation to the other
Justices. How did the drafting process happen in
Chief Justice Warren's chambers, Earl?
Pollock: I can't recall specifically. I know Gerry Gunther
was shepherding this through the different
drafts.[70] The only thing that I remember very
clearly was that there was no dispute about the
basic draft that the Chief distributed, except
insofar as Black and Douglas asking for the
deletion of any references to the class actions.
Moderator: What was he thinking about in avoiding that
phrase, "class action?"
Pollock: Well, Dan may be in a better position to comment
on that. My understanding is that, number 1,
Black did not like the concept of class actions.
Number 2, he did not foresee even the possibility
that there could be large-scale desegregation of the
South. Number 3, I think he felt, as you suggested
before, that there was a certain logic in saying that
once the constitutional right has been declared, it
should follow that that would be implemented,
which I think led him to the view that the specific
named plaintiffs-only a handful-should be given
immediate admission, and consistent with that you
eliminate the reference to "class actions." And so
that the whole problem of implementation, as far
as he was concerned, would be essentially a very
minimal process. I don't understand the logic of
his objection because Brown I specifically stated
7o Gunther, who was one of Chief Justice Warren's three law clerks during the
Court's October Term 1954, was his principal assistant as he worked on Brown II.
See generally supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Gunther's clerkship with
Chief Justice Warren ended on August 14, 1955. Later that year, the Chief Justice
sent Gunther, who then was living and practicing law in New York City, a
photograph and an inscribed copy of the Court's Brown II opinion. Gunther promptly
wrote back to thank the Chief Justice for these mementos: "you know that I shall
always treasure them as a remembrance of an exciting, wonderful year." Letter from
Gerry Gunther to Chief Justice Warren, Jan. 2, 1956, at 1, in EW LOC Box 63.
Warren soon wrote back in kind: "I want you to know that I, too, have a very happy
remembrance of our intimate association last year." Letter from Earl Warren to
Gerald Gunther, Jan. 16, 1956, in EW LOC Box 63.
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that these were class actions and that it was
because they were class actions there had to be a
separate argument and decision on how this should
be implemented-
But Brown II makes no reference-
Because of the complexity. But then after Brown
H was decided and the cases were remanded to the
district courts, those cases were class actions-they
were class actions when they were brought, and
they were class actions on remand, and the district
court judges had to deal with the class action
problems. So I remain confused as to what
precisely was the rationale that Justice Black, who
was a very smart man, had in mind. Maybe Dan
has some thoughts.
The only thing I can share on that is the
conversation I had with him a couple of years later,
in which he said that he was still convinced they
should have ordered immediate admission on a
non-segregated basis of the named plaintiffs, and-
This is guesswork but I have a feeling that he may
have thought that would have lessened the adverse
reactions in the South, that it would be limited in
its immediate impact and leave everything else for
another day. But that's pretty much guesswork. I
can't shed much more light on it than that.
It's pretty interesting that in one of these things
that I've been reading-Earl, you may know more
about this-in one of Chief Justice Warren's
memoirs or a book about him, he stated shortly
after the two cases that he had received so much
acclaim for getting a unanimous Court and doing
this wise thing, but that he gave credit to the way
this thing was handled by the southern Justices, to
Clark and to Black and to Reed.[71] Do you
remember that?
71 Warren, speaking in his Supreme Court chambers about Brown to a friend
from California, reportedly said, "Don't thank me,.... I'm not the one. You should
see what those ... fellows from the southern states had to take from their
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They were the ones who really knew the problem,
and when they went along-
Not only did they know the problem, but I think he
felt that it was much easier for the northern
Justices to agree that the South should
desegregate. He recognized that for these Justices,
like Black, who grew up in the Deep South, that
that was really a tremendous revolution in
thinking, and I think he recognized how Black and
others-in particular, Black-would be vilified as
he was in his own home area for having sold out
the South. So that this was a great sacrifice and it
was, to a great extent, a patriotic, statesmanlike
move on the part of Black, quite contrary to what
his natural self interest might have appeared to be.
You know, it's interesting that this decree is short,
concise, and simple in the same way that Brown I
was. It doesn't mention, just by way of example,
two of the questions that the Justices posed to the
parties for them to address on the argument about
the decree. One related to the possible use of
special masters. There is nothing in here about
special masters, it doesn't say you can have it or
you can't have it-it just ignores the whole subject.
And there were a number of other things kind of
rattling around there that are just never dealt with
at all.
Let's turn to decision day. It is Tuesday, May 31,
1955, the day after Memorial Day. The Justices
take the bench at noon to announce decisions, and
this is the second one. Were you in the courtroom
and was it a momentous announcement?
constituencies. It was absolutely slaughter. They stood right up and did it anyway
because they thought it was right." Scudder interview, Bancroft Oral History, quoted
in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN & His SUPREME COURT-A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 106, 785 n. 117 (1983) (ellipses in Schwartz book).
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I was there. Black, a few minutes before 12:00,





And never before or since have I so gloried in the
words-lawyers consider them sort of pro forma-
that are at the end of the opinion, "It is so ordered."
Finito.
The descriptions of the Brown I announcement-
and of course, two of you [Pollock and Prettyman]
had been there on May 17, 1954-include a kind of
gasp in the courtroom when Warren uses the word,
"unanimously." Was there that kind of palpable
experience as Brown H was being announced?
No.
No. I didn't sense it.
I think it was more-not routine, but it didn't
involve the kind of emotional reaction that-
And I think part of it was that one of the reactions
was, "What does that mean? What are they
saying?"
You know, it's interesting on this question of
secrecy, in not talking to the clerks and then in
talking to the clerks, and the change, the
particular attention that was given to Brown I,
particularly more so than Brown II. As Dan said,
Justice Black didn't really discuss it at all. Is that
right, Dan?
That's right.
Reed, of course, did discuss it a lot-so I
understand from Fassett. But the two Justices
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who were reported to have said something to their
clerks on the way to the robing room-I'm talking
about Brown I now, which was the secretive one-
were Justice Clark, who said to his clerks on his
way through their office, "I think you boys ought to
be in court today," and Justice Reed, who did the
same thing to Fassett and Mickum.
That's what Black did in Brown II.
Did he?
Same thing.
Well, we sort of knew that Brown H was coming
down. I don't know how I knew that-maybe
Barrett called me. (Laughter)
Barrett, you have raised the issue of a listener
wondering what it meant. I recognize that it was
fifty years ago, but when one reads the opinion, I
must say that it's filled with a lot more push on the
accelerator than lift off the accelerator. You've
read some of these phrases: "prompt and
reasonable start;" "burden rests on the defendants
to establish that delay is necessary;" "good faith
compliance" and, I must add to that list,
"admission with all deliberate speed the parties to
these cases."[72] In other words, I think even "all
deliberate speed" is a push phrase[73]-
It was perfectly clear that something had to begin
right away, but I think what people couldn't quite
understand, and I'm not sure they still do, is then
what? I mean, how long do you get? Do you do it
by school class years? Do you do it by six months
72 See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955).
73 Cf. Gunther, Some Reflections on Judicial Role, supra note 13, at 822(reminding a 1979 conference audience that the "'prompt and reasonable start'
provision... was in the [Brown I] decree, and was intended to be a command as
clear as the more widely publicized and attacked direction that, once that prompt
start was made, completion of the process was to proceed 'with all deliberate
speed"').
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or ten years or a lifetime? I mean, what does that
mean?
My impression was that outside of the courtroom
there was what I would describe as sort of a
collective sigh of relief across the South. They
were off the hook immediately. What this meant
was that it was something for another day.
Because it didn't have a deadline?
Right.
Okay. Of course that was a point that was argued,
I mean within the Court-it had come up in the
Court, and in the chambers. The point was-and
you remember this, Earl; all of you do, very well-
should it contain some guidelines. In other words,
should it say-
Should it contain a deadline?
Yes, and should it say, "You ought to do this, and
you ought to do that, you have to do it by such and
such"-that was a point of discussion.
In retrospect, it's hard to see how the Court
could've done anything other than what it did.
That's my feeling.
Because a deadline-let's say five years-would
then become-Nobody would do anything for five
years. That was the problem with the deadline.
The deadline was asked for by just a few states.
As I said earlier, I left the Court that day feeling
that I'd done a momentous service to my country.
You did.
Not that I'd done a damn thing.
Of course, given the tremendous unfinished
business of this country, many revisionist critics
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look back on the Brown H decree as a missed
opportunity. They say that the Court should have
done so much more, be it a deadline, be it a decree,
be it specific requirements. Against that, I'd like to
read you a note that Justice Frankfurter sent to
Chief Justice Warren that afternoon:
Dear Chief:
The harvest of today's planting
won't be fully assessed for many a day. For
me it's a safe bet that the wisest historian of
the Court a half century hence will acclaim
the long-headed wisdom of what your
opinion said and not less so what it didn't
say.
In any event, I am content.
Yours faithfully,
FF[74]
And let me tell you, that last sentence from
Frankfurter is remarkable. I never knew him to be
content. (Laughter)
It strikes me as a typical Frankfurter ploy to curry
favor with the Chief.
I would ask you to assess the note and also perhaps
to locate yourself between the harsh criticism of
modern hindsight and the contentment-at least
the professed contentment-of Justice Frankfurter
in 1955.
This is one of those situations where it is very easy,
if you will, to find fault with what the Court did or
didn't do. It is much more difficult to turn around
and say precisely what they should have done.
"Forthwith," I am convinced, would have been
ignored, and then what would've happened? Once
anybody got away with doing nothing, would that
have spread? I don't know. But just as there
were- There is a book out on what Brown I
should have said, where academics wrote their own
74 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Earl Warren, May 31,
1955, in EW LOC Box 574.
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opinions, all of which were ten times worse than
what the Court did. [75] So here too, I think it is
easy to say, well, they should have done more. But
it's difficult to put your finger on exactly what they
should have done that they did not do. I'm not
saying they necessarily did the right thing. I'm
just saying this was a difficult problem.
Pollock: I think the question of how you evaluate Brown I
depends on what was expected from the decision.
If what was expected was the end of black poverty,
equality of educational opportunity for black
children, racial balance, then Brown II was a
failure. But if you judge Brown II in terms of what
was the only function it could undertake to perform
given the limitations of the law-that is, ending
the horrifying compulsory segregation of blacks
and whites in public schools-it has proved to be a
major success. It took too long, but desegregation
has been accomplished.
A number of critics say, "Well, but
segregation still continues because you have some
schools that are almost all black and have other
schools that are all white." They say in addition
that in some places where there had been racial
balance, there now is what is called
"resegregation." That's a whole different issue-it
deals with concentrations of blacks in particular
areas, which is reflected in the racial balance of the
schools that they attend. That was not the
objective, nor could it have been the objective, of
Brown to change that.
I think that critics of Brown to a great
extent engage in a play on words with the word
"segregation." They easily move from legally
imposed segregation to what is called de facto
segregation-that is, the fact that there may be a
lack of racial balance. And I think that does a
great disservice in analyzing where we are in racial
75 WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S
Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack
M. Balkin ed., 2001).
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Prettyman:
Davidson:
relations and it certainly does a great disservice to
what the Court sought to accomplish and could
possibly accomplish in 1954 and 1955.
One of the principal revisionist critics of
Brown is a colleague of Dan's at the University of
Virginia, Professor Michael Klarman. He wrote a
superb book, and it has been highly honored.[76]
It's interesting what position he takes about Brown
II. He says "[t]hat Brown II was a mistake from
the Court's perspective and that was quickly
apparent." But in the next paragraph, he says that
"[t]o say that Brown II was misguided is not to say
that the Justices calculated foolishly." Then he
goes on to say that, "[i]n retrospect, the Justices
should have been firm and imposed deadlines and
specific desegregation requirements." Then he
asks, "Did their miscalculation matter much?
Probably not." And he says, "Most white
Southerners would oppose desegregation until they
were convinced that resistance was futile and
costly. The Court was powerless to make that
showing on its own." [77]
It seems to me that, even on the basis of
Kiarman's revisionist criticism of Brown I and
Brown II, those decisions come out very well.
I come at it from a slightly different standpoint. I
think that Brown I and Brown II, although they
were very carefully limited internally to education,
actually began a revolution outside of education
because you not only got the Civil Rights Act, but
you got blacks voting more and beginning to vote
more blacks into public office. The landscape today
is just nothing like it was-
I couldn't agree more with Barrett. To me, the
great glory of the Brown cases I and II was, as I
said earlier, that it opened the faucet. It pulled the
plug. It let the flow of equality in governmental
76 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
77 Id. at 320.
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intervention, to be sure that rights were protected
and equal protection became a reality rather than
a myth. And I think it was a monument regardless
of the cases themselves involving only the schools.
It was the beginning of something that, of course,
should have been heard in this nation many years
before, but at least it did occur, and it did occur in
Brown.
And you go back and think what fate did to
get Brown. You have to go back to the Roosevelt
appointees. Would Brown have come without the
Roosevelt appointees? I don't know. Would things
have been different if the New Deal hadn't come
upon us? I'm not arguing the Democratic point of
view, but I am saying how fate plays into these
things. So if you had a Court with Chief Justice
Fred Vinson-who happened to be a graduate of
the same college as I am, and he was a good friend
of the family and a very fine man-would that
have happened? If Roosevelt had not appointed
Black? Reed, perhaps? Certainly Douglas? You
know, it opened the floodgates to what should have
been done many years ago.
Meador: One of the extraordinary things about it
jurisprudentially speaking is that the Court put
enormous emphasis on public education in the
Brown decision. That was the whole thrust of it,
the uniqueness, distinctiveness of education in
relation to the separate but equal doctrine. But
then you turn around a year or two later and
suddenly, without much explanation, segregation
on golf courses, buses, everything else, goes. And
I've never seen any real efforts to explain that on
the part of the Court. It's a rather extraordinary
jurisprudential kind of twist.
Pollock: Well, I think I can offer a suggestion, and that is
that the Court was trying to stick to what is often
regarded as a key principle of constitutional
interpretation: "Thou shalt make constitutional
interpretations as narrowly as possible." I think
another reason for that was the problem of getting
acceptance just with respect to public education-
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that in itself was such a massive undertaking that
I think the Court was trying to limit the scope of
the ruling as much as possible. But it was obvious
that once Brown came down, the same thing in
principle would have to apply to courthouses,
parks, swimming pools, every other kind of public
facility. And it worked out so that the Supreme
Court did not even have to rule on that. What
happened was there was a series of lower court
decisions applying Brown I to these various kinds
of public facilities, and in the Supreme Court
certiorari was denied-
Well, they had to appeal from a three judge court,
which was summarily affirmed.
Right. Summarily affirmed-no opinion, just an
order, and the Court never had to really get into-
That's what I'm saying. They never explained how
you jumped from public education to those
facilities.
Well, I know that you're right because, as I've
mentioned before, in a different setting,[78] Justice
Jackson had a few suggested changes in Brown I,
and the Chief Justice rejected one of them
specifically because it could have applied outside of
education-he, being the grand politician that he
was, very definitely wanted this to relate solely to
education. I think part of it was that he thought
that was about as much as people could absorb at
one time.
But don't you think he also knew that this was, as
Earl said, the beginning of a flow?
Of course he did.
So he didn't have to do it at that time-
78 See E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Thoughts on Justice Jackson's Unpublished
Opinion, delivered at Chautauqua Institution's Athenaeum Hotel (Oct. 8, 2003)(transcript available at www.roberthjackson.org/Man/SpeechesAboutJackson_
BrownvBoard).
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Pollock:
Moderator:
You know it all depends, Dan, on what you regard
as the crux of Brown L In my own view, Brown I
was rejecting the underpinning of Plessy. It said, if
you recall, that if blacks see an inferior status
imposed on them by segregation, that's just their
own imagination or their own perception.[79] To
me that was the fundamental issue, and then the
effect of Brown I on black students was in effect
the application of that broader principle, so that
when the question of the application of Brown I
came up with respect to, let's say, golf courses or
courthouses, I think a lower court reading Brown I
would have said, "It is impossible for us to reach a
different determination here, even though we're
dealing with a different kind of public facility."
On that note, I'm sure you will all join me in
thanking our guests. We no longer can have direct
contact with their Justices, but I feel confident that
they, fifty years since Brown II, would agree that
their law clerks continue to perform extraordinary
service. It has been a pleasure to have Barrett
Prettyman, Dan Meador, Earl Pollock, and Gordon
Davidson here today. On behalf of the Robert H.
Jackson Center and the Supreme Court Historical
Society, thank you very much. (Applause)
79 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying
fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this
be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.").
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